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The international business literature offers four primary reasons for firms moving 
parts of their value chain abroad: they desire access to markets, resources, efficiencies, or 
strategic assets. Despite suggestions by prominent scholars (e.g., Dunning) that there may 
be a fifth motive – the desire to escape from institutional settings that hinder a firm’s 
ability to achieve its goals – convincing evidence in support of this motive has been 
elusive. 
 Current studies of escape-based internationalization tend to come from adjacent 
disciplines, and are usually conceptual in nature (thus providing no empirical support) or 
are qualitative, survey-based examinations (thus limiting generalizability and potentially 
over-relying on stated, versus revealed, preferences). Moreover, quantitative, empirical 
studies that do exist typically fail to control for the big four traditional motives (i.e., they 
examine covariates, control for non-motivational confounds, and then assume escape has 
occurred). 
 In hopes of providing persuasive evidence in support of this fifth motive, I 
combine a natural experiment-based research design (to help control for omitted variables 
and reverse-causality) with predictions derived from behavioral decision-making theory 
(to disentangle traditional from escape-based motives). This allows me to provide 
iii 
 
quantitative, empirical evidence that accounts for traditional motives and is based on 
realized, as opposed to stated, preferences.   
 I found that predicted relationship directions equaled actual directions for 24 
hypotheses (18 were statistically significant) versus four where predicted and actual 
directions diverged (two were statistically significant).  I thus conclude that escape-based 
internationalization does happen, with higher degrees of home-country institutional 
deterioration prompting quicker and more aggressive foreign investments.  
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 CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
One of the most cherished constructs in international business is distance; not 
literal, linear geographical distance, but distance as a metaphor (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999) 
depicting bilaterally heterogeneous norms, values, or rules.  A common, unifying theme 
within this literature is the assumption that distance increases the liability of foreignness 
experienced by firms (Bae & Saloman, 2010; Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 1995), and in doing 
so, negatively affects performance (Chao & Kumar, 2010; Evans & Mavondo, 2002; 
Morosini, Shane & Singh, 1998; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003).  Thus, distance is also 
presumed to affect firm conduct, in a preemptive bid to prevent poor performance (e.g., 
Brouthers, 2002; Contractor & Kundu, 1998; Perkins, 2009; Xu, Pan & Beamish, 2004). 
These assumptions often seem taken for granted, as scholars continuously 
consider its impact on the strategies, actions, and performance of multinational 
enterprises at the individual, industry, country or regional levels.  For example, five 
seminal papers alone – Johanson and Vahlne (1977), Johanson and Vahlne (1990), Kogut 
and Singh (1988), Kostova (1999), and Kostova and Zaheer (1999) – have been cited 
over 11,000 times (Google Scholar, 2013).  Considering the thousands of additional 
papers employing the distance metaphor in one fashion or another, one can easily see 
how important the field considers this construct to be. 
In the tradition of Murray Davis (Davis, 1971), however, I choose to examine an 
interesting conundrum.  Despite the widespread prominence of the distance construct 
within international business, there is a potential white elephant in a room, a possible fly  
in the proverbial ointment: empirical support for the theory that distance negatively 
affects firms is not as strong as the theory’s dominance would suggest (e.g., Tihanyi, 
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Griffith, & Russell's 2005 meta-analysis).  I propose that we do not find the 
overwhelming evidence we predict because it does not exist.  I do not suggest that no 
evidence exists; this is obviously not true.  I simply suggest that the preponderance of 
evidence is mixed, as while distance may negatively affect firm performance and (in 
preemptive bids to avoid reduced performance) conduct, its effects may also be neutral 
or, in some cases, even complementary. 
Thus, expanding Shenkar's (2001) critique of cultural distance to the broader 
domain of institutional distance, I examine the claim that distance is only problematic 
when it causes friction, and thus suggest that scholars shift their focus from the distance 
between home and host countries to misalignments between institutions and multinational 
enterprise goals.  In order to determine the validity of this claim, scholars must examine 
the effects of institutional misalignment (institutional misalignment) on firm conduct and 
performance.   
The first step, and the specific goal of this dissertation, is to offer a preliminary 
test of the former by examining internationalization decisions by Latin American 
multinational enterprises experiencing institutional misalignment within their respective 
home countries.  To do so, I combine a natural experiment based research design with a 
partial least squares model.  The research design, rather than statistical methods, is the 
primary means of controlling for omitted variable bias, reverse causality, and temporal 
covariates (e.g., internationalization has tended to increase over the years).   Predictions 
based on the behavioral decision making heuristics literature (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979) help delineate between traditional internationalization motives (based on the 
prospect for potential gain) and my proposed institutional misalignment-based motives 
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(whereby institutional misalignment at home prompts multinational enterprises to move 
parts of their value chain abroad in an attempt to avoid loss).   Partial least squares helps 
me simultaneously test multiple dependent variables related to degrees of institutional 
change and various characteristics related to multinational enterprise internationalization 
activity that may be affected by institutional misalignment. 
I hope to contribute to the literature by: (1) helping to shift the institutions 
discussion towards institutional misalignment-based examination, (2) showing that home 
country factors (as opposed to host country attributes) are relevant when examining 
multinational enterprise internationalization, (3) providing quantitative empirical 
evidence that escape is a genuine internationalization motive, in a manner that controls 
for traditional internationalization motives, (4) examining – in accordance with Brouthers 
(2013) suggestions for future institutions research – institutional effects of managerial 
decision making via a holistic consideration of multiple institutions within the same study 
(rather than single institutions at a time), and (5) offering compelling, quantitative 
empirical evidence in support of adding a fifth FDI motive – escape-based FDI – to the 
four traditional FDI motives. 
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CHAPTER 2:  CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
In order to make a compelling case that institutional misalignment affects 
decisions to internationalize, I must first show that institutions matter.  Thus, I begin by 
reviewing literature related to institutions and multinational enterprises.  I then offer 
evidence that the desire for multinational enterprises to escape from home markets 
characterized by institutional misalignment is one worth considering.  I do this primarily 
by offering real world examples and a logical explanation for why escape might occur, in 
conjunction with a review of the many scholarly papers on escape-based 
internationalization.  This literature is dominated by qualitative evidence, primarily 
because of a central testing issue: When firms decide to go abroad, how do researchers 
separate escape from traditional gain-seeking motives (Witt & Lewin, 2007)? As I claim 
that the employment of a behavioral decision-making lens may help us disentangle the 
two motives and, thus, tease out escape-based effects, I next offer evidence that 
behavioral heuristics: (1) affect decision making, (2) within firms, and (3) with respect to 
internationalization decisions in particular.  Once the logic and literature I offer 
establishes that institutional misalignment may, indeed, drive escape, and that a 
behavioral decision making lens is a suitable one to adopt, I offer specific details 
regarding the empirical test I plan to conduct (e.g., proposed methods, variables, etc.). 
Institutions 
Institutional Theory Overview 
North (1990) defines institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that 
structure human interaction”, and says they consist of the “formal constraints (rules, laws, 
constitutions), informal constraints (norms of behavior, conventions, and self-imposed 
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codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics”; they are “the rules of the 
game”, so to speak, that dictate a society’s incentive structure (3).  Examples include 
legal institutions that formally regulate behavior in a society, financial institutions such as 
those making up a country’s capital markets, and informal institutions such as currently 
popular moral norms, e.g., a population collectively viewing firms that promote 
environmental sustainability in a positive light while disapproving of firms that pollute. 
The exacting precision of their mathematical models notwithstanding, 
neoclassical economists often assume a frictionless and static business environment 
where transactions are free, and the strategies of firms relatively unconstrained by 
institutional forces (North, 1981).  In reality, transactions have very real costs, costs that 
are often magnified when operating abroad, e.g., negotiation costs, the costs of writing 
and enforcing contracts for each transaction, etc.  (Coase, 1937; Wallace & North, 1986; 
Williamson, 1981).  These costs, as well as the set of strategic choices available to firms, 
are directly influenced and/or constrained by the institutional framework within which 
firms operate (Alston, Eggertsson, & North, 1996; Bruton, Dess, & Janney, 2007; Bueno 
de Mesquita & Root, 2000; Lee, Peng, & Barney, 2007; North, 1990; Wan & Hoskisson, 
2003). 
Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, and Wright (2000), and Peng, Wang, and Jiang (2008), 
thus, explicitly note the importance of institutions to scholars studying multinational 
enterprises, with Peng et al. (2008) imploring scholars to explicitly account for 
institutions via a three legged stool metaphor, with resource, industry, and institutional 
based views of the firm as legs.  In other words, while resource and industry factors are 
vital, institutional factors deserve a clear place at the table too.  Accordingly, recent 
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research does suggest that institutions – in categories related to the conducting of 
business, such as regulatory or tax burdens, labor market rigidities, rule of law, property 
rights and corruption (but not in categories related to democratic rights of citizens to 
select or critique government officials) – do affect multinational enterprise 
internationalization decisions, especially with respect to entry mode (e.g., foreign direct 
investment) and location choice (Dewit, Görg, & Montagna, 2009; Globerman & 
Shapiro, 2002a, b; Grosse & Trevino, 2005; Javorcik & Spatareanu, 2005; Kostova, Roth, 
& Dacin, 2008; Stein & Daude, 2001; Trevino, Thomas, & Cullen, 2008; Wei, 2000). 
Heterogeneous, Non-ergodic Settings 
The concept of escape from one institutional environment to another also implies 
that institutional settings differ.  In other words, there must be some place for firms to 
escape to.  Indeed, settings do differ, e.g. the case of “transition” economies, where the 
very word “transition” refers to the transformation from one institutional configuration, 
such as communism or socialism, to another.  Furthermore, differences do not only exist 
between extreme institutional settings along the lines of communism versus capitalism.  
Drawing on research streams from political science and socioeconomics, various studies 
suggest the existence of multiple varieties of capitalism, based on heterogeneous 
institutional configurations resulting from different histories, cultures, and goals (Albert, 
1993; Chandler, 1990; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Redding, 2005; Wade, 1990; Whitley, 
1999).  Moreover, not only are the institutional matrices different when comparing 
nations in different regions, they are also different when comparing firms in the same 
region, e.g., Asian countries versus other Asian countries (Orru et al. 1997). 
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Another stream of research introduces the constructs of Coordinated Market 
Economies (CMEs) and Liberal Market Economies (LMEs), where firms either adjust to 
environmental changes on their own, with other firms copying the practices of the more 
successful firms, resulting in initial heterogeneity but eventual isomorphism, versus 
economies where aggregate level change is voluntarily implemented or dictated by labor 
unions, governments, etc. (Albert, 1993; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Witt & Lewin 2007).  
This is not the same as centralization or decentralization, where a central authority in a 
socialist or communist country, or an authoritarian ruler, makes centralized decisions 
versus the decentralized decision making we are used to in the United States.  For 
example, the U.S. is a decentralized LME while Germany is a fairly centralized CME.  
One point to be extracted from this research stream is the idea that CMEs are slow to 
adjust, prone to groupthink, and bound to suffer in unison if poor decisions are made.  
Witt (2008) thus predicts that as societal coordination increases, institutional 
misalignment will increase. 
Further evidence of heterogeneous non-ergodic institutional environments comes 
from A.T. Kearney’s annual FDI Confidence Index report (2007-2012) that includes the 
results of surveys of managers with strategic decision making responsibilities in the 
Global 1000 (the 1,000 largest firms in the world based on annual revenues, representing 
60 countries, 6 continents, and 17 industries).   As always, the FDI Confidence Index 
report includes updates of important changes in the institutional environments of various 
countries around the globe.  Each year's list of changes serves to illustrate that the global 
institutional environment is not merely heterogeneous; it is also dynamic and always 
changing.  (This is an important attribute, as I propose that institutional departures from 
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equilibrium may spur FDI activity.)  A sampling of institutional changes can be found in 
Table 1, which lists some of the more important changes that occurred in 2007.  
Institutional Distance 
With regard to institutional distance, specifically, I begin by acknowledging 
studies that provide evidence in support of the assertion that institutional distance is 
important.  For example, many studies suggest that institutional distance (with respect to 
factors such as those examined above) negatively affects both multinational enterprise 
conduct (e.g., Benassy-Quere, Coupet, & Meyer, 2007; Brouthers, 2002; Contractor & 
Kundu, 1998; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Xu et al., 2004) and performance (e.g., Chao & 
Kumar, 2010; Evans & Mavondo, 2002; Morosini et al., 1998; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003).  
Offering an example of institutional distance’s potential shortcomings, however, 
Brouthers and Brouthers (2001) begin by examining several studies related to entry 
mode.  They first note that Anand and Delios (1997) and Padmanabhan and Cho (1996) 
find a direct relationship between wholly owned entry modes (allowing for maximal 
multinational enterprise control) and distance.  The logic is straightforward: when firms 
are dealing with parties in countries they know little about, opportunities for 
opportunistic behavior increase; this results in firms deciding to maximize levels of 
control via the internalization of external processes.  The problem, as they go on to note, 
is that Kogut and Singh (1988) and Erramilli and Rao (1993) found that distance was 
related, instead, to shared-control modes of entry.  Erramilli (1996) and Gatignon and 
Anderson (1988), meanwhile, find no relationship at all between distance and entry mode 




2007 Institutional Settings Update 
Country Update 
Indonesia While rich in natural resources and possessing the 4th largest 
population in the world, Indonesia has had trouble attracting 
FDI due to institutionally related issues such as an over-
burdensome regulatory environment and security concerns, 
but is now promising to improve customs rules, labor laws, 
taxation levels, property rights, and bureaucracy levels.   
Thailand Thailand dropped completely off the 2007 index due to 
political stability concerns after a military coup. 
Germany In response to concerns that businesses were leaving due to 
institutional disadvantages, Germany cut corporate taxes from 
39% to 30%.  “Union wage restraint" is mentioned as another 
positive development. 
United Kingdom The U.K., with twice as much IFDI as its closest European 
rival, continues to benefit from higher transaction costs 
imposed on U.S. markets by Sarbanes-Oxley, due to a more 
favorable regulatory environment and skilled workers. 
Russia Respondents noted an improved economy, large markets, and 
skilled labor, but more than half decided to pull back or hold 
investment constant due to political concerns including the 
threat of nationalization, poor rule of law, and crime. 
France Outlook improved due to promised reforms, e.g., education, 
labor flexibility; the recent financial crisis, though, seems to 
have tempered reform. Protectionism concerns remain. 
Africa Concerns remain the same, with 92% mentioning bureaucracy, 
80% citing political instability, 69% citing poor public 
infrastructure, and 58% mentioning the poorly skilled 
workforce as reasons to avoid Africa. 
Source:   A.T. Kearney’s 2007 FDI Confidence Index Report 
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mixed!).  In other words, there is often little consistency with regards to findings, when 
statistically significant findings exist at all. 
Other scholars provide more troublesome evidence.  For example, (Tihanyi et al., 
2005) conducted a meta-analysis consisting of 66 independent samples, with sample sizes 
ranging from 2,255 to 24,152.  They ultimately concluded that no statistical evidence of 
direct relationships exists between informal institutional distance and entry mode choice, 
international diversification, and multinational enterprise performance. 
Shenkar and colleagues (2001, 2002, 2008, 2012) refer to potential conceptual 
and methodological concerns associated with the distance construct, taking issue, for 
example, with the assumption that distance is always problematic, the assumption that 
distance is constant, and the assumption that perceived distance and its effects are 
symmetrical with respect to each involved actor.  They thus advise scholars to forego the 
artificial precision of neatly quantifiable distances and, instead, focus on friction.  
Originally coined by Williamson (1975), friction represents difficulties between 
transacting partners.  The key point with respect to institutions is that while institutional 
distance may cause difficulties and thus create friction, sometimes distance is simply not 
a problem. 
For example, Dunning (1998) explicitly notes that the ability of firms to identify 
and reconcile distance-based differences, or even exploit them, can translate into 
competitive advantage.  As illustrations of this, Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee and 
Jayaraman (2009), Park, and Ungson (1997), and Reus and Lamont (2009) find that 
increased levels of distance can actually improve the performance of international 
mergers and joint ventures, as complementarities and an increased ability to overcome 
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cognitive rigidities results in synergy.  When distance is a problem, however, friction 
exists, and this, rather than simple distance, per se, is what firms should worry about.  In 
other words, it is a matter of fit, or alignment, more so than distance per se.   
Given the conceptual flaws and lack of supporting empirical evidence that 
consistently affirms the real-world applicability of the distance construct as currently 
used, I thus suggest a shift in focus from studying the effects of distance between home 
and host countries, towards studying degrees of alignment or fit between firms, 
themselves, and the countries that they operate in.  Figure 1 illustrates the directional 
effects of institutions that have been adopted by the broader literature.  Figure 2, 
meanwhile, illustrates my institutional misalignment-based conception of how 
institutions affect firms, with degrees of alignment or misalignment between institutions 
and what firms are trying to achieve affecting conduct and performance. 
Simply poking holes in the universal applicability of the institutional distance 
construct, however, is not the same thing as providing convincing evidence that 
institutional misalignment is a worthy supplement to institutional distance-based thought.  
In order to make a plausible claim that institutional misalignment is also a useful 
construct, I must demonstrate its validity as a predictor, i.e., I must first demonstrate that 
misalignment actually matters, and that despite its relative neglect by international 
business scholars, it is something that is actually important to firms.  To do so, I offer an 
empirical test of whether or not formal institutional misalignment affects firm conduct.  
As the type of conduct I examine is internationalization decisions – more specifically, the      
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Figure 1.  Current Theory of Institutional Distance Affecting Firm Conduct and Performance 
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decision by multinational enterprises to escape home countries where institutional 
misalignment is deemed as a threat to their ability to operate at acceptable levels of 
efficiency – the next section provides theoretical and literature-based evidence that 
escape responses to institutional misalignment are a genuine phenomenon that is worthy 
of further study. 
Institutional Misalignment and Escape-Based Internationalization 
Figure 3 illustrates various degrees of alignment between the desire of 
multinational enterprises to operate efficiently and their institutional settings at home and 
abroad, along with typical internationalization motives that I suggest are associated with 
each institutional situation.  Each of the next four subsections briefly describes a cell in 
this figure. 
Aligned at Home and Abroad 
Much international business literature concerns firms from developed countries 
with advanced institutional frameworks expanding into other similarly developed 
countries.  The OLI (Ownership, Location, and Internalization) framework is the bedrock 
of the traditional explanation of the phenomenon of the multinational enterprise’s in-
vestment in foreign locations.  Early work on the subject was done by Buckley and 
Casson (1976), who defined the value of internalization and, thus, the importance of 
operating in, rather than simply exporting to, a foreign country.  The greater the 
perceived net benefits of internalizing foreign operations (and leveraging proprietary 
intangible assets), the more likely a firm will be to engage in foreign direct investment.   
15 
 
Dunning (1981, 1988) is given primary credit for developing the eclectic paradigm of 
internationalization, suggesting that a firm must have a source of advantage – ownership 
specific, location specific, or internalization specific – available to it to overcome the 
inherent costs and disadvantages of competing with domestic rivals in a host country. 
The three sources of competitive advantage in this paradigm can be explained as 
follows: (1) the firm might have developed proprietary assets, such as brands or 
technologies, in its home market which can give it an advantage in the host market (the 
“ownership” advantage); (2) the firm might be able to integrate activities across sectors 
of the world with very different factor costs and resource costs giving it an advantage in 
the host market (the “location” advantage); and (3) the firm might be able to derive an 
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Figure 3.   Matrix of Institutional Misalignment and OFDI Motivation 
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advantage from building economies of scale and scope through internalizing activities 
spread across many countries (the “internalization” advantage). 
Based on this theory, it has been long argued that firms choose to engage in 
foreign direct investment only when they believe that they can exploit existing firm 
specific competitive advantages abroad (i.e., an asset-exploitation perspective).  While 
this is commonly accepted as true, more recently, it has been argued (e.g., Almeida, 
1996; Chang, 1995; Chen & Chen, 1998; Kogut & Chang, 1991; Shan & Song, 1997) 
that firms might engage in foreign direct investment in an effort to protect, increase, or 
develop competitive advantages by gaining access to knowledge, resources, and/or 
markets in the host country (i.e., an asset-augmentation perspective) that are not available 
in the home country.  These two perspectives are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but 
rather it has been argued (Dunning, 2006) that multinational enterprises that engage in 
asset-augmentation, would only do so under the belief that it could gain entry or sustain 
operations in a host country by exploiting an existing competitive advantage.  
Furthermore, ownership advantages can be those developed internally in existing 
operations or simply the competency to seek and absorb external assets and knowledge 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Dunning, 2006). 
There are four commonly accepted motivations for firms to engage in foreign 
direct investment: multinational enterprises may seek new customers (market seeking), 
lower costs (efficiency seeking), access to inputs of production (asset seeking), or new 
capabilities (strategic asset seeking).  It is important to note that firms can often have 
mixed motives (invest for more than one reason simultaneously), complementary motives 
(combine two or more motives to accomplish a particular goal), or evolutionary motives 
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(investment reasons change over time) to engage in foreign direct investment (UNCTAD, 
2006).  The upper left cell in figure one simply suggests that the primary drivers of 
outward foreign direct investment from aligned environments to other aligned 
environments are traditional asset exploitation and augmentation motives. 
Aligned at Home, Misaligned Abroad 
Multinational enterprises sometimes engage in foreign direct investment into a 
host country even though there is misalignment between its strategies and the institutions 
of that country.  This is often because the potential consumer market, efficiency gains, 
and/or low cost labor costs of the host country make operating in a misaligned 
environment worth the difficulties that are associated with experienced misalignment.  
For example, many multinational enterprises from developed countries have decided to 
engage in foreign direct investment into China and Mexico, though there are well-
documented difficulties in operating in these countries (e.g., excessive bureaucracy, poor 
infrastructure, corruption, safety issues, etc.).  It is possible, though, that the risk of not 
entering a market may be greater than the increased cost of operating in a difficult 
environment, e.g., a multinational enterprise may view potential initial losses as a small 
ante gambled in hopes that a large and underexploited market may become profitable in 
the near future.  In this way, multinational enterprises believe that their preexisting firm 
specific advantages (e.g., technology, managerial expertise, product knowledge, and 
industry experience) can be exploited in such a way as to overcome the increased 
transaction costs of operating in a difficult environment (Buckley & Casson, 1976; 
Hymer, 1976).  Thus, multinational enterprises in this quadrant have traditional 
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motivations to engage in foreign direct investment and believe that they will be able to 
overcome potential increased costs. 
Multinational enterprises may also choose to enter misaligned environments in 
order to establish legitimacy in the minds of consumers (Kostova et al., 2008).  By 
establishing host-country operations that employ locals, multinational enterprises may 
overcome any liability of foreignness that its brands may encounter in the consumer 
marketplace (Zaheer, 1995).  Furthermore, multinational enterprises may feel the need to 
invest in misaligned environments for the simple fact that global competitors are 
investing in the country and as such the firm can’t risk being left out of the potential 
market. 
A company specific example might be Halliburton’s well-publicized move to 
Dubai.  By moving from the United States to the UAE, Halliburton moved from a 
country generally considered to have high quality institutions to one ranking lower on 
many indexes.  While CEO, Dick Cheney lobbied the Clinton administration to ease 
sanctions on Iran, while Halliburton subsidiaries – much like those of Chevron, Conoco-
Phillips, Cooper-Cameron, Exxon-Mobil, GE, Northrop-Grumman – actively engaged in 
business with them (Jau, 2004).  Critics claim that Halliburton was attempting to avoid 
U.S. taxes and regulations.  Halliburton, meanwhile, claims the move has nothing to do 
with escape-based motives, citing proximity reasons for the move (i.e., this is where the 
oil is today) and blaming criticism on political opportunism.  Taking their reasoning at 
face value, they would seem to be moving for a fairly traditional motive that is 
compelling enough to them to offset any perceived misalignment with the institutional 
environment on the whole.  (If their critics are right, however, then perhaps this example 
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belongs in the “escape” quadrant.) Thus, the lower left cell in figure one suggests that the 
primary drivers of outward foreign direct investment from aligned environments to 
misaligned environments are traditional asset exploitation and augmentation motives that 
are compelling enough to overcome the misalignment. 
Misaligned at Home and Abroad 
During WWII it was noted that social scientists were often better at interpreting 
wartime data than physical sciences; the theory was that they were used to working with 
bad data and that practice thus conferred certain advantages upon them in this arena 
versus physical scientists used to working with perfectly controlled experiments.  Along 
similar lines, developing market companies used to operating in suboptimal institutional 
environments (e.g., third-world countries where graft is customary) may be better 
equipped to do what it takes to get the job done versus multinational enterprises from 
countries like the U.S. In situations such as these, it has been shown that emerging market 
multinational enterprises (EMNEs) may have an advantage compared to multinational 
enterprises in less developed markets, because they have more experience dealing with 
similar institutional constraints at home, e.g., imperfect contracting environment, less-
developed market mechanisms, poor legal system, burdensome regulations, political 
instability, etc.  (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Morck, Yeung, & Zhao, 2008).  In other 
words, the managerial expertise gained at home in dealing with poor institutional 
infrastructure becomes an asset and potentially a competitive advantage for developing 
market multinational enterprises in dealing with the difficulties of another misaligned 
environment.  In this sense, a disadvantage in one setting at one point of time (i.e., having 
a misaligned home market) may become an advantage in another setting or point of time.  
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These multinational enterprises may also be better prepared to meet the consumer 
preferences of a similar market.  Thus, the lower right cell in figure one suggests that the 
primary driver of outward foreign direct investment from misaligned environments to 
other misaligned environments is a desire to exploit familiarity based advantages. 
Misaligned at Home, Aligned Abroad (Escape) 
Finally, the upper right quadrant depicts firms who decide to move parts of their 
value chain abroad as an escape response when institutional factors at home are perceived 
to be misaligned with multinational enterprise goals.  The logic is as follows: (1) 
international business literature suggests that host country institutions affect multinational 
enterprise behavior and performance.  (2) In line with the Northian (e.g., North, 1981) 
economics lenses international business scholars draw upon (where, unlike in 
international business, the dominant study of institutions involves the effects of home 
country institutions on firm conduct and performance), the exact same logic with regard 
to the capacity for institutions to affect firms abroad also applies at home, i.e., home 
countries also have institutions, and institutions have effects here as well.  (3) Thus, just 
as they sometimes do when examining foreign institutions, decision makers at firms in 
certain locales may sometimes feel that local institutions impede their ability to operate 
as efficiently as they might prefer (i.e., institutions differ by country, with some settings 
viewed more favorably than others; and the institutional matrix governing one's home 
country may not always be deemed desirable).  (4) As globalism has intensified 
competitive pressures, decision makers within firms must thus consider potential 
responses to institutional sources of inefficiency, one of which is moving parts of their 
value chain to greener institutional pastures.  Heterogeneous and non-ergodic institutional 
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settings, after all, logically suggest a spiky global landscape where multinational 
enterprises (and prospective multinational enterprises) are not obligated to stay in 
locations not conducive to their success and may, thus, consider institutional arbitrage as 
a legitimate option to improve their material lot.  In other words, the escape literature 
simply takes currently accepted logic (from the institutions and multinational enterprise 
literature) and applies it to all countries, rather than merely host countries. 
Studies considering home country institutions, either in isolation or relative to 
potential hosts, offer suggestive evidence that escape motives may, indeed, exist.  For 
instance, Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005) find that multinational enterprises care about 
labor market regulations, with higher host rigidities - on either an absolute or relative 
basis - associated with lower foreign direct investment.  Dewit et al. (2009) similarly 
study home/host comparisons of labor laws and find that higher rigidities result in less 
foreign direct investment.  The fact that studies find that relative bases matter implies that 
home conditions matter too and, thus, that escape-motives may be possible.  Globerman 
and Shapiro (2002) argue that good home institutions (testing a group including rule of 
law, political stability, regulatory burden, government effectiveness, graft, and political 
participation by citizens) should increase not just IFDI, but outward foreign direct 
investment too, as they create conditions that make multinational enterprises with cash to 
invest more likely to emerge in the first place.  They also, however, note the possibility of 
a counter-effect, i.e., if things are good at home, why leave? In other words – referring to 
outward foreign direct investment as FDO – they claim that the same beneficial home 
country institutions "that encourage foreign direct investment will discourage FDO" (p. 
1912).  Finding mixed support for their claims, their study implicitly suggests the 
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possibility of an escape-motive; if beneficial institutions encourage firms to stay, it stands 
to reason that less beneficial institutions may encourage firms, ceteris paribus, to leave. 
With respect to more direct evidence, Table 2 offers an overview of the escape 
literature, most of which is qualitative in nature, and much of which comes from adjacent 
disciplines such as economics and political science.  Witt and Lewin (2007) claim that 
'escape' is an underexplored but important new area of international business inquiry.  For 
example, if one searches for "FDI" and "Foreign Direct Investment" on Google Scholar, 
the number of cites for the studies on the first page of search results for each search term 
alone adds up to nearly 16,000.  In other words, tens of thousands of studies may focus 
on, or refer to, FDI.  Per Witt and Lewin’s (2007) claim, this means that the 27 studies in 
Table 2 may represent less than 1% of 1% of the FDI literature.   
Moreover, nearly all of these studies either adopts a qualitative or case-study 
approach (with findings that may not generalize), or a quantitative approach with no 
explicit mechanism designed to disentangle loss- from gain-base motives (leaving us 
unsure of the degree to which FDI was actually motived by a desire to escape as opposed 
to traditional gain-based motives).  This means that the number of quantitative, empirical 
examinations that adequately disentangle loss- from gain-seeking motives is even 
smaller. 
Thus, in response to Witt and Lewin's (2007) call for more exploration in this 
area, I hope to help international business move beyond the study of the impact of 
institutional distance or host country institutions on firm conduct and, instead, provide 




Review of 'Escape' Literature 
Study Summary of findings 
Andreff (2003) Offers examples of escape from 
"restrictive regulations" 
Boddewyn and Brewer (1994) Escape is an expression of avoidance, 
which constitutes one form of non-
bargaining business political behavior 
Caves (1996) Suggests high home country tax rates spur 
OFDI 
Deng (2009) Chinese OFDI is driven by home country 
institutional forces, in the form of escape 
from local institutional constraints or via a 
push from local institutional incentives  
Dunning and Lundan (2008) Adds escape to Dunning's original 4 FDI 
motives, offering example of MNES in 
Hong Kong, China, America, Sweden, and 
Europe in general escaping institutional 
environments characterized by stringent 
regulation and high taxation 
Dunning (1996) Says one FDI motive is "to escape 
restrictive legislation or macro-
organizational policies by home 
governments" (p 61) 
Duran (1987)* Home market difficulties led to MNE 
escape from Spain from 1979-1985 
Gordon and Hines (2002) Firms may escape to avoid high taxes 
Herrmann (2009)* Escape is one response to unsupportive 
labor, antitrust and financial institutions 
Jaklic and Svetlicic (2003) Poor institutions leading to a poor 
macroeconomic and business environment 
led Slovenian firms to escape 
 (table continues) 
24 
Table 2 (Continued) 
Review of 'Escape' Literature 
Study Summary of findings 
Kayam (2009)* Institutional proxies related to 
bureaucracy, corruption, investment risk 
and labor conditions show that OFDI was 
an escape response 
Le and Zak (2006)* Capital flight is driven by political 
instability, economic risk and policy 
uncertainty 
Lewin et al. (2009)* Offshoring is less a function of cheap labor 
as it is an escape response to institutional 
environments that are not conducive to the 
creation of talented labor 
Luo, Xue and Han (2010) Examination of 29 regulations governing 
Chinese OFDI suggests that OFDI is a 
response to local institutions that push 
firms abroad (escape and/or promotion) 
Morck, Yeung, Zhao (2008) Notes that restrictive business regulations 
may be spurring Chinese OFDI 
Mudambi and Navarra (2002) Notes that when institutional settings are 
no longer deemed competitive, firms may 
decide to leave for more acceptable 
settings 
Nachum and Aharoni (2000)* Service firms compensate for deteriorating 
home country advantages by conducting 
escape-based FDI 
Narula (2002) Institutions related to national innovation 
systems hinder R&D efforts, prompting 
OFDI to more suitable locales 
Nijkamp (2006) Adds escape to four common FDI motives 
(e.g., western MNEs seeking to escape 
restrictive home country regulatory 
environments) 
 (table continues) 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
Review of 'Escape' Literature 
Study Summary of findings 
Rugman and Verbeke (1998) Conflict b/w MNEs and governments may 
prompt opportunistic relocation 
Schoppa (2006) OFDI is in part an escape response to 
overregulation 
Stal and Cuervo-Cazurra (2011) Brazilian OFDI is often an attempt to 
escape institutional voids and excessive or 
misguided regulations 
 
Svetlicic and Jaklic (2006) Primary motive in case studies was escape 
from noncompetitive institutional 
environments 
Tallman (1988)* Political instability at home influences 
escape-based OFDI to U.S 
Vernon (1988) MNEs may escape to save on taxes or 
avoid unhelpful governments 
Witt and Lewin (2007) IM in the form of high levels of societal 
coordination lead to increased OFDI 
Yamakawa, Peng and Deeds (2008) Institutions favoring competitors may 
prompt escape- based OFDI 
* quantitative studies 
 
 
misalignment affects firm conduct.  Furthermore, I hope to do this by studying whether or 
not misalignment at home prompts firms to move abroad in a way that accounts for the 
effect of traditional motives. 
I begin by examining various options available to firms when confronted with 
institutional misalignment in their home country.  When home country institutional 
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misalignment is an issue, firms must decide how they will respond.  Witt and Lewin's 
(2007) taxonomy of multinational enterprise reactions to institutional misalignment 
includes four potential choices: acceptance (analogous to “loyalty” in Hirschman's [1970]  
famous political economy taxonomy), abatement (analogous to Hirschman’s “voice”), 
diminution (no Hirschman analogue), and escape (roughly analogous to Hirschman’s 
“exit”).  DiMaggio (1994) and Oliver (1991) note that conforming, either consciously or 
mimetically, confers legitimacy and access to capital.  It is also typically the ‘status quo’ 
option. 
Thus, the default strategy for many firms is simply Witt and Lewin's (2007) first 
option: acceptance.  Firms also often operate in negotiated environments, attempting 
abatement strategies designed to change the misalignment, via lobbying or co-opting 
misaligned elements (Oliver 1991; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Diminution involves an 
attempt to diminish the impact or cost of misalignment.  For example, shared capital from 
business groups and relationship based agreements in India and China may serve as 
informal substitutes for underdeveloped financial and legal institutions (Kedia, 
Mukherjee, & Lahiri, 2006; Yiu, Lu, Bruton, & Hoskisson, 2007).  Another example of 
firms attempting to minimize the impact of institutional misalignment is offered via 
Stone, Levy, and Paredes’ (1996) study of Brazilian firms operating in the informal 
economy, as opposed to passively accepting onerous regulatory oversight. 
Note that these strategies are not mutually exclusive, and the divide between 
domestic versus foreign company is not always crystal clear.  Consider the example of 
Maryland based candlemaker, Chesapeake Bay Candle (CBC).  A “born global” firm, 
i.e., a firm that was an multinational enterprise from inception, CBC, headquartered in the 
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U.S. but with production exclusively in Asia, decided to build a plant in the U.S. As 
Aeppel (2011) notes, unexpected regulatory hurdles in the U.S. led to expensive delays 
and compliance costs, denting margins and forcing them to backup deliveries that were 
supposed to have been manufactured domestically with products made abroad.  In 2004, 
however, the U.S. candle industry undertook political action and lobbied the government 
to more than double import duties to over 108%.  (Due to responses blurring the line 
between abatement, compensatory diminution designed at offsetting the cost of 
institutional mandates, and naked rent-seeking, Aeppel notes that U.S. candle makers 
now enjoy an 80% domestic market share.) 
Finally, if firms do not wish to accept the misalignment, and diminution and 
abatement are insufficient, they may escape; as Mudambi and Navarra (2002) pithily 
note, if a locale loses its competitiveness, firms may move. 
Examples of Escape 
Some institutions affect all, or at least most, firms.  Other institutions affect a few 
specific firms in isolation.  I now provide examples of each type – from both the 
scholarly literature and current headlines – that may help illustrate why firms may wish to 
escape. 
Duran’s (1987) study of Spanish multinational enterprises, and Mudambi and 
Navarra’s (2002) overview of the study of institutions by international business scholars, 
note that when general institutional conditions result in poor operating environments, 
multinational enterprises experiencing difficulty within their home countries may 
consider leaving.    
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Nachum and Aharoni (2000) conceptually examine how deteriorating home 
country conditions can erode home-based location advantages, prompting firms to 
escape, and then conduct a study of U.S. service firms (advertising, managerial 
consulting, engineering consulting, accounting, law), ultimately finding that “firms may 
maintain their competitive position through foreign direct investment” (p. 76), as outward 
foreign direct investment attenuates the negative effects of deteriorating home market 
conditions.  They also offer the example of misaligned labor markets prompting Japanese 
manufacturers to escape.   While their focus here was on conditions resulting in higher 
labor costs, labor market rigidities of other types seem influential as well. 
For example, in a paper titled, “Do Foreign Investors Care About Labor Market 
Regulations”, Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005), find that labor market regulations 
resulting in rigidities (e.g., laws dictating conduct with regard to the hiring or firing of 
employees, or those that affect labor market climates in general) are associated with 
lower foreign direct investment.   As relative – and not just absolute – bases mattered, 
this suggests that multinational enterprises are clearly cognizant of home market 
conditions as opposed to simply focusing on institutional distance or host conditions.   
Dewit et al. (2009) similarly explore home/host comparisons of labor laws, as opposed to 
institutional distance or host conditions, and also find that higher rigidities negatively 
impact multinational enterprise investment.  Hermann’s (2009) study of pharmaceutical 
companies based in Germany, Italy, and the U.K. goes a step farther, directly tying 
misaligned labor market institutions (as well as institutions related to finance and antitrust 
laws) with escape-based responses. 
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Today’s headlines, in fact, are full of complaints from businesses that are unhappy 
with various institutional policies within the countries they call home, with labor 
intensive businesses operating in countries with rules that encourage rent-seeking (or are 
simply inefficient) at the forefront.  The Economist (e.g., 2012 [a]; 2012 [b]), for 
example, has recently run a series of articles documenting problems along these lines in 
both Italy and France (where mandated levels of social spending per employee – and the 
unemployment rate – are twice as high as they are in post-reform Germany).  The New 
York Times (Geitner, 2012: 1), meanwhile, reports on this past June’s ruling by Europe’s 
highest court which declared that if European workers get sick during their legally 
guaranteed 6 weeks of annual vacation leave, they “were legally entitle to take another 
vacation”.  Firms that complain about having to absorb the cost of labor policies such as 
these, while having to compete globally against firms that are free to operate more 
efficiently, have no legal recourse.   
In the U.S., Boeing’s battle versus the National Labor Relations Board (The Wall 
Street Journal, 2011) has been in the headlines, as have complaints of U.S. executives in 
Silicon Valley.  The late Steve Jobs, for example, bitterly complained to President Barack 
Obama about the regulations that gummed up the works for high-tech companies that 
were supposed to be the country’s engine for growth, and about crippling union work 
rules, before warning the President that if he did not make America more business 
friendly, he would be a one-term president (Isaacson, 2011). 
Kayam (2009), meanwhile, tested the effects of institutions related to 
bureaucracy, corruption, investment risk and institutions affecting not just the cost of 
labor, but also the availability of skilled workers, via a sample of outward foreign direct 
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investment from 65 countries from 2000-2006.   Noting that home country institutional 
conditions were indirectly related to outward foreign direct investment, he suggests that 
firms move abroad as an escape response.    
Lewin, Massini, and Peeters (2009) similarly focuses on the impact of home 
market institutions on the availability of skilled labor (e.g., H1B visa rules), and how this 
affects the offshoring (both outsourced and captive, i.e, foreign direct investment) of 
innovation functions: “Consistent with Oliver (1991), we assume that companies react 
strategically to consequences of misalignments between their strategic needs and the 
configuration of the institutional structure and the macro environment in which they are 
embedded...  Firms can react by, for example, escaping the institutional constraints of the 
country (Witt & Lewin, 2007) and responding to the emerging talent shortage by 
accessing talent offshore and by learning to globalize their innovation activities.” (p. 
906).  Employing survey data of managers involved in 476 projects, they find that the 
desire to escape home markets where institutions result in a shortage of skilled labor is an 
important driver of moving business functions abroad, while labor arbitrage designed to 
capitalize on home/host cost differentials is less important than many assume. 
Similarly focusing on innovation, Narula (2002) conducted surveys of 35 
Norwegian R&D firms, finding that those focused on radical innovation characterized by 
technological discontinuity often feel that new institutional settings are more aligned with 
their goals than home country institutions.  Characterized by firms as slow, an 
impediment to dynamism, and seemingly designed to regulate low technology, resource-
based sectors, firms cite high levels of paperwork and bureaucracy.  Local institutions are 
also perceived to be a barrier to the development of homegrown talent, with firms noting 
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that their access to qualified labor is not aided by institutions, but developed “in spite of 
the government” (p.  812).   Thus, many of these firms expand abroad in an attempt to 
escape excessive regulation and other forms of institutional misalignment. 
Dunning (1996) and Nijkamp (2006) add escape desires to Dunning’s original 
four foreign direct investment motivations (market, resource, asset and efficiency 
seeking), with Dunning claiming foreign direct investment may occur "to escape 
restrictive legislation or macro-organizational policies by home governments" (p. 61).  
Oliver (1991) and Hirschman (1970) speak of escape from burdensome regulation, noting 
that American chemical manufacturers moved abroad to sell domestically banned 
chemicals, while Wallison (2006), Factor (2006), Murray (2006) and Leon (2006) 
suggest that foreign stock exchanges, especially the LSE, have been among the biggest 
beneficiaries of Sarbanes-Oxley, as firms decide to register abroad.  Andreff (2003), 
Jaklic and Svetlicic (2003), Morck et al., (2008), Schoppa (2006), Svetlicic and Jaklic 
(2006), and Witt and Lewin (2007) offer further examples of escape-based foreign direct 
investment.  This year's FDI Confidence Index (2012) echoes these findings, noting that 
upon asking Global 1000 executives in North America, Europe, and Asia about issues 
related to foreign direct investment, "the most significant concern…is regulatory activity 
within countries" (p. 7). 
The experience of medical research firm, Regenexx, offers a striking example of a 
firm-specific case of institutional misalignment related to regulation.  In an Wall Street 
Journal op-ed this past April, former FD commissioner Andrew von Eschenbach (2012) 
noted that as FDA commissioner, he “saw firsthand how regenerative medicine offered a 
cure for kidney and heart failure and other chronic conditions like diabetes” (p. 15), 
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before noting that breakthroughs, however, “have been stalled by regulatory uncertainty” 
and are, thus, “a long way off”.  He continues: “The FDA isn't obstructing progress 
because its employees are mean-spirited or foolish”.  They are, instead, bound by 
dysfunctional rules.  Thus, innovation is slowed relative to competitors in more 
hospitable institutional settings.  As an example, he notes that Regenexx invented a way 
to repair damaged joints using patients’ own stem cells, U.S. regulations were simply too 
burdensome and onerous relative to rules in other countries. 
Stal and Cuervo-Cazurra (2011) suggest that the desire to escape institutional 
voids, as firms attempt to avoid excessive or misguided regulations for settings where 
institutions are more developed and in closer alignment with multinational enterprise 
goals, is one of two major factors spurring Brazilian outward foreign direct investment.  
Luo, Xue, and Han (2010) examine 29 regulations governing Chinese outward foreign 
direct investment and ultimately suggesting that outward foreign direct investment is a 
response to local institutions that push firms abroad.  Sometimes this is a direct response 
to regulation, while at other times it is an attempt to escape institutional voids related to 
property rights or legal systems that are more likely to exist abroad.  Deng (2009) and 
Yiu et al. (2007) provide further evidence that outward foreign direct investment may be 
driven by home country institutional forces, often in the form of escape from institutional 
voids or from institutional settings that favor competitors. 
Yamakawa, Peng, and Deed (2008) also claim that institutional misalignment 
whereby politicians pass laws which favor competitors may prompt escape-based 
outward foreign direct investment.  Escape may also be a response to institutional 
misalignment arising as a result of political instability or conflict between home 
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governments and multinational enterprises (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Le & Zak, 2006; 
Rugman & Verbeke, 1998; Tallman, 1988). 
Vernon (1998) suggested escape as a response to not just misaligned political 
institutions, but to excessive taxation as well.   Benassy-Quere et al. (2005) note that 
liberalization of capital flows allows firms to escape high tax settings, while Boskin and 
Gale (1987) show that domestic tax policy changes increasing domestic levels of business 
investment by $1 prevents $.04 from moving.  Harris (1993) finds that removing 
favorable tax treatment of domestic capital expenditures results in increased multinational 
enterprise spending abroad.  Slemrod (1990) suggests that multinational enterprise 
transfers to foreign subsidiaries increased when U.S. tax burdens increased.  Meanwhile, 
Hines and Rice (1994) have noted that the share of total U.S. capital abroad located in 
''tax haven" countries has increased rapidly over the years, with Clausing (2005) 
mentioning escape as the reason, while noting that 6 of the top 10 U.S. multinational 
enterprise affiliate locations have effective tax rates of 9% or less.  Hajkova, Nicoletti, 
Vartia, and Yoo (2006) summarizes 13 tax related foreign direct investment studies, 
showing an average semi-elasticity of -2.94.  Gropp and Kostial (2000) find evidence that 
high domestic taxes influence multinational enterprises to invest abroad before showing 
that low tax countries have half the net outflow as high tax countries, and estimating that 
high taxes may have cost Italy and Germany up to half of one percent of GDP annually in 
terms of lost revenue due to escape.  Caves (1996), Collins and Schackelford (1995), 
Gordon and Hines (2002), and Hines (1991) similarly suggest taxes as a cause of escape-
based outward foreign direct investment. 
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Lest readers object that this is an axiom – of course firms will leave if they think 
local institutions hurt their competitiveness! – I would remind them that the question is 
not actually settled.  It is an empirical issue, which must be empirically tested, before we 
can definitively claim that our intuitive prediction is actually truth.  Considering taxation, 
for example, remember that this is a day and age of transfer pricing, serving to mitigate 
the effects of corporate taxes.  It is also a time of agglomeration, with firms increasingly 
locating within, or near, industry specific hubs in places like Silicon Valley, irrespective 
of the tax consequences.  Accordingly, many scholars (the most prominent of whom may 
also be the most vocal, Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman) claim that countries may often 
raise taxes with relative impunity, as firms will not necessarily leave (Andersson & 
Forslid, 2003; Baldwin & Krugman, 2004; Borck & Pflüger, 2006; Brülhart, Jametti, & 
Schmidheiny, 2012; Kind, Knarvik, & Schjelderup, 2000; Ludema & Wooton, 2000).  
Thus, one further contribution of this dissertation will be to provide further evidence 
regarding whether this specific form of institutional misalignment prompts escape 
decisions or not. 
I finally offer a slightly more compelling example – a short case study of a single 
country – before describing how I will conduct my own test of whether escape is a 
genuine phenomenon or not. 
The German Example 
In the example of firms being unhappy with labor institutions in France, I noted 
that French regulations were different that those in post-reform Germany.  This begs the 
question: why did Germany reform? It may have something to do with institutions 
prompting firms to escape, and the desire of the German government to reverse that 
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trend.  From 1995 to the early 2000s, the German economy struggled, as GDP per capita 
fell by more than a third and didn’t fully recover until 2004.  To make matters worse, 
foreign direct investment inflows dropped from $27.2 billion in 2003 to negative $38.6 
billion in 2004 after revisions to the German tax code made it less attractive for foreign 
companies to retain liquid assets in Germany (A.T. Kearney, 2005).  Witt and Lewin 
(2007) found a 400% surge in outbound foreign direct investment between 1990 and 
2003, standardized for GDP.  Furthermore, the Bundesbank explicitly pointed to taxes, 
social security contributions, and burdensome regulations and labor market inflexibilities 
driving German firms to escape (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1997), while Buch, Kleinert, 
Lipponer, and Toubal (2005), citing more recent Bundesbank surveys of German 
executive outward foreign direct investment rational, similarly noted high domestic labor 
costs, taxes, and levels of bureaucracy as reasons for leaving.  Muller and Student (2003), 
in fact, found that every seventh entrepreneur surveyed planned to move some production 
abroad, every ninth planned to move all production abroad, and every 13th planned to 
move their headquarters abroad, while Piotti (2007) examined articles in the German 
press discussing German firms leaving the country and found that among the over 250 
articles, 70% of them attribute the exits to a lack of competitiveness associated with 
institutional factors such as high tax rates and labor market inefficiencies as opposed to 
the attractiveness of foreign lands.  Finally, Schneider (2008) notes that increased taxes 
and social security payments, burdensome labor market rules, insufficient institutional 
quality, and low tax morale have resulted in a shadow economy of roughly 15% of GDP.  
With Germany serving as a fairly modern Hayekian reminder that firms may not view 
themselves as pieces on a chessboard to be moved around by the whims of technocrats, 
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the upper right cell in figure one suggests that a significant driver of outward foreign 
direct investment from misaligned environments to aligned environments may be a desire 
to escape the misaligned environment. 
Most of these examples of escape, whether recounted in the media or offered by 
scholars, share one of two common weaknesses.   The first is that the majority consist of 
qualitative case studies based on either anecdote or observation of single, or small groups 
of, firms.  Thus, even if escape was a primary motive, we do not know if this motive 
generalizes to broader settings.   The second limitation is that the few studies that are 
quantitative are typically suggestive in nature.  In other words, they either offer findings 
that are consistent with escape-based hypotheses without actually directly testing whether 
firms escape, or they fail to control for the possibility that escape has a flip side: gain.  
Thus, how do we know for sure that firms who venture abroad are not actually doing so 
on the basis of traditional gain-seeking motives? For example, if a firm leaves a high-tax 
for a low-tax locale, is this efficiency-seeking foreign direct investment or escape?  In the 
next section, I describe how I approach these issues. 
Behavioral Decision Making 
Witt and Lewin (2007) find a .52 correlation between an increase in a country’s 
outward foreign direct investment stock and the degree to which centralized bureaucrats 
and politicians attempt to coordinate multinational enterprise action, and suggest that the 
reason for this correlation may be a desire to escape less hospitable institutional 
environments.  They then note that "outward foreign direct investment will exhibit 
different characteristics depending on whether the motivation behind firm strategy is 
framed in the minds of the decision-makers in terms of seeking to capitalize on improved 
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conditions abroad or in terms of avoiding deteriorating conditions at home" (2007: 590).  
This raises a tricky question, however: how do researchers delineate gain- versus escape-
based motives within quantitative, empirical studies? As Benassy-Quere et al.'s (2007) 
critique of Globerman and Shapiro (2002) – due to their inability to consider both home 
and host county institutions simultaneously – suggests: findings that do not address this 
question should be interpreted with caution  Figure 4's depiction of the four traditional 
foreign direct investment motives illustrates this issue.  (Consider the previously offered 
example of a firm moves from a high to a low tax country; again, how do observers 
determine if their motive the potential gain of cost savings abroad or an actual desire to 
escape an inhospitable environment?) 
It should be formally noted that I do not suggest foreign direct investment 
motivations are mutually exclusive.  In fact, I assume that motives probably exist 
simultaneously or, that if sequenced, then once a firm does decide to exit a country for 
greener institutional pastures, traditional foreign direct investment motives do come into 
play at that point.  After all, once a firm decides to escape, why not choose refuge within 
countries offering lucrative markets or resources, or in countries offering desirable 
efficiency or strategic considerations? The problem is how to tease out escape-based 
motives from the larger set of motives that undoubtedly drive foreign direct investment 
decisions.  With this problem in mind, Witt and Lewin (2007) suggest that cognitive 
psychology offers an answer in the form of a rich behavioral decision-making literature 
that studies heuristics associated with various cognitive biases, biases that may serve as a 




Cognitive biases, simply put, are decision-making heuristics employed by the 
brain to help it make decisions.   Perhaps the most famous example of bias is Kahneman 
and Tversky’s 1979 paper on prospect theory (prospect theory), which is the most cited 
article in Econometrica history (over 26,000 cites according to Google Scholar as of 
June, 2013), and for which Kahneman was awarded the Nobel Prize (Maccoun 2002).   
The basic finding is that decision-making behavior is governed by frames of 
reference related to the prospect of loss versus gain.  For example: 
Example 1.   Kahneman and Tversky (1981) found over 70% of people 












Figure 4.  Illustration of Entanglement Problem ('E' Represents Escape) 
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choice when the exact same problem is framed differently, e.g., “200 of 
600 people will die” vs.  “400 of 600 people will be saved”.   
Example 2.   Carmon and Ariely (2000) studied students at Duke 
University who either won or didn’t win Final Four basketball tickets in a 
lottery and found a 1400% difference in WTP (Willingness to Pay, 
representing potential gain) and WTA (Willingness to Accept, 
representing loss aversion) values, when the rationally expected difference 
should be close to 0%. 
When studying the impact of reference frames on decisions, one immediately 
recognizes is that cognitive biases often dominate rational calculus, as the intensity of 
pain associated with losses is greater than the intensity of joy associated with gains.  
Fully rational actors should exhibit subjective valuations of gains and losses that are 
comparable to actual losses.  Instead, what researchers typically find is that actual and 
subjective values do not correspond on a one-to-one basis.  If subjective values are 
pegged to the actual values of gains, so that  one unit of actual gain is equal to one unit of 
subjective value, one unit of actual losses tends to less than one unit of subjective gain 
(on an absolute basis, i.e., -2 and +2 each has an absolute value of 2). 
This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 5, which superimposes Kahneman and 
Tverksy’s (1979) originally proposed prospect-theory value function on top of the value 
function that Li and Yang (2012) recently found.  The expected value function (the red 
line) is based on a rational analysis of mathematical equivalence.  For example, if a 





Rational decision-makers thus have no preference between these two options.  The blue 
lines represent the value functions according to Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) and Li 
and Yang's (2012) studies. 
The difference between Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) value function and Li 
and Yang's (2012) value function reminds us that actually measured subjective values 
may differ according to sample or context.  For example, empirically derived estimates of 
how much more subjective value is associated with the desire to avoid loss relative to the 
desire to seek gains often conclude that losses are weighted roughly twice as heavily as 
gains (Hastie and Dawes, 2001).  Li and Yang’s (2012) Journal of Financial Economics 
study, however, found that losses are weighted nearly four times as heavily as gains when 
Figure 5.  Prospect Theory Value Function 
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expected return distributions are negatively skewed in the minds of decision-makers (as 
they often are in the domain of losses).   
Regardless of how much more weight decision makers give to avoiding loss 
versus the seeking of gain, the common finding is that the direction of bias remains (with 
loss-aversion always a more powerful motive relative to gain-seeking). 
The implication of these findings for escape-based outward foreign direct 
investment is that executive decisions regarding whether to move abroad may differ 
depending upon whether the decision is framed in terms of avoiding losses associated 
with institutional misalignment or in terms of the prospect for gain associated with 
traditional foreign direct investment motives. 
A Potential Problem 
The widespread acceptance of behavioral decision-making theories suggests that 
there is something to them.  There is a potential problem, however, with respect to 
applying these theories to business settings.  Claiming that decision-making heuristics 
associated with cognitive biases affect investors, heads of states, researchers, physicians, 
students, and other common subjects of this literature is, quite simply, not the same thing 
as showing that it is applicable to decision-makers within firms, who have the capacity to 
make foreign direct investment decisions.  After all, while heads-of-state or social 
scientists at Stanford and MIT are intelligent decision makers, CEOs and other top 
management team members are generally assumed to be more like doctors in the above 
example, i.e., both intelligent and experienced experts with respect to the types of 
decisions they regularly make as a part of their job.  This may attenuate bias (with the 
possible exception of biases related to hubris? Also, multinational enterprise decisions 
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may be made by groups.  All it takes, in theory, to prevent cognitive bias from 
influencing an otherwise rational decision is for one member of the group to catch it and 
enlighten the rest. 
Finally, the discipline inherently provided by markets for managerial control, and 
by consumer markets in general, may select for firms and managers that are less prone to 
irrational biases, as firms that underperform (or go out of business) replace (or release) 
these less rational managers.  Thus, before one accepts the claim that behavioral theories 
are an acceptable lens for studying firm conduct, a number issues must first be broached.  
Fortunately, the organizational decision-making, group decision making, psychology, and 
medical literatures offer a rich and robust study of just such issues.   
Intelligent Experts 
Regarding intelligence, these literatures suggest that high general mental aptitude 
and being an ‘expert’ in an area are generally orthogonal traits with respect to degrees of 
susceptibility to cognitive bias induced errors of reasoning (Christensen, Elstein, 
Bernstein, and Balla, 1991; Kuhberger, 1998; Loke & Tan, 1992).  For instance, 
Stanovich and West (2008) document seven such studies, finding very little difference 
between the susceptibility of high cognitive groups versus low cognitive groups. 
Groups 
Regarding the applicability of findings at the individual level of analysis to groups 
of people making decisions (as is often the case within firms), Kameda and Davis (1990), 
Neale and Northcraft (1986), and Whyte and Sebenius (1997) find that groups are often 
prone to many of the same cognitive biases that affect individuals.  Kuhberger’s (1998) 
meta-analysis confirms that results are robust when groups are studied as opposed to 
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individuals, while Milch, Weber, Appelt, Handgraaf, and Krantz (2009), referring to the 
same risk-based decision making outcomes predicted by prospect theory, note that, “For a 
risky choice problem, a similar framing effect was observed for groups and individuals” 
p. (242). 
Firms 
Biases like prospect theory do seem to generalize from individuals to highly 
intelligent individuals, who may make decisions together rather than in isolation.  While 
certainly suggestive, this does not necessarily mean that groups of smart people within 
firms are similarly susceptible.  Fortunately, there is a literature that addresses this 
subject.  DiMaggio (1994) notes that organizations are prone to similar cognitive biases 
as individuals are, while Andersen, Denrell, and Bettis (2007), Devers, Wiseman, and 
Holmes (2007), Fiegenbaum and Thomas (2004), Holmes, Bromiley, Devers, Holcomb, 
and Mcguire (2011), Mayhew (1979), and March and Shapira (1987) suggest prospect 
theory is applicable at the organization level of analysis in addition to the individual 
level.  Roxburgh (2003) also catalogues various cognitive biases that affect CEOs and 
other high-level decision makers within firms, while Hult (2011) documents prospect 
theory as a potential driver of managerial decisions. 
In the strategic management literature, Teece (2007) invokes prospect theory to 
explain how managerial decision making, influenced by instinctively loss-averse 
mindsets, results in an undervaluing of innovative, versus incremental, investments, and, 
thus, the failure to develop dynamic capabilities: "Contemporary developments in the 
decision sciences highlight the critical influence of felt emotions on choice...a welter of 
evidence demonstrates that when assessments based on affect are at odds with those 
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based on computation, the visceral often overpowers the rational to determine behavior” 
(p. 1507). 
Finally, suggesting a key potential moderator, Forlani (2002) suggests prospect 
theory is most suitable when managers have less direct control over outcomes – a finding 
that meshes well with previously mentioned foreign direct investment studies that suggest 
outward foreign direct investment occurs when firms have no direct control over the 
institutions that temper their efficiency or help their competitors. 
Internationalization Decisions 
Horn, Lovallo, and Viguerie (2005) document the effect of cognitive bias on 
market entry.  In terms of foreign direct investment decisions, specifically, Benassy-
Quere et al. (2005) and Head, Ries, and Swenson (1999) note that increasing tax rates 
seem to disturb firms more than decreasing rates seem to please, which seems to imply 
that losses hurt more than gains feel good, just as prospect theory predicts.  Witt and 
Lewin (2007), meanwhile, draw upon prospect theory research (Gilovich, Griffin, and 
Kahneman (2002); Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982); Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 
Thaler & Johnson, 1990; Thaler, 1994) that suggests foreign direct investment decisions 
are, indeed, influenced by prospect theory.  Buckley, Devinney, and Louviere (2007), 
Hosseini (1994, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2008), Rosenboim, Luski, and Shavit (2008), Simelyte 
and Liucvaitiene (2012) and Tang and Zhen (2009) provide further support for the 
assertion that prospect theory's predicted loss-aversion affects managers making foreign 
direct investment decisions. 
Aharoni (2011) summarizes research on behavioral decision-making and foreign 
direct investment, and forcefully argues that the literature suggests foreign direct 
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investment decisions are influenced by behavioral elements (such as prospect theory) in 
addition to rational analysis: "Clearly, managers behave according to different rules than 
those assumed in much of the international business literature" (p. 23). Pointing to 
shortcomings in both rationalist and internationalization approaches to foreign direct 
investment (related to a complete lack of incorporation of actual decision making 
processes and associated theory), Devinney (2011) notes that foreign direct investment 
decisions, as opposed to most managerial decisions, involve complex sets of possible 
choices that may involve many managers, many intermediate decisions, many 
consultations with many advisors or policymakers; more decisions and more decision 
makers mean more uncertainty and also more chances for behavioral biases to take root, 
leading him to ultimately suggest that "...the reality is that 'firms' do not make decisions.  
Managers make choices - either as a group or individually - nested in the environments 
and organizations in which they operate"... (p. 63) and rigorous incorporation of theory 
combined with solid empirical evidence mandates the acknowledgement that managers 
making foreign direct investment decisions "may bring with them all the behavioral 
baggage of human decision making as well as the complexity and randomness of their 
organizations" (p. 64). 
Similarly noting that biases are potentially influential with each involved decision 
maker at each step in the foreign direct investment decision making process, Pinheiro-
Alves' (2008) survey of decision makers involved in 112 foreign direct investment deals 
in Portugal in 2004 (12% of all recorded deals) determined that behavioral heuristics 
accurately predict foreign direct investment decisions, and that uncertainty increases the 
reliance on these cognitive rules. 
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Appeal to Logic 
In addition to an appeal to literature to support claims that prospect theory may 
affect managerial decision making, I also rely on an appeal to logic.  As an example, 
consider Ma and Wright (2010), who found that while agency theory (AT) and prospect 
theory both predict risk averse managerial decisions prior to the implementation of 
appropriate corporate governance mechanisms designed to promote healthy levels of risk 
taking, post-implementation decisions diverge along the lines of managerial competence.  
AT assumes rational managers and predicts increased risk taking in response to 
mechanisms that align incentives in a way that makes it in a manager’s material self-
interest to take more risk.  Prospect theory, however, assumes less rational managers who 
are not sufficiently swayed by these corporate governance mechanisms, as they are 
irrationally risk-averse.  Attempting to reconcile these predictions, Ma and Wright found 
that the behavior of competent managers was better predicted by AT, while prospect 
theory predicted the behavior of less competent, and presumably less rational, managers.   
There are several differences, however, between the scenarios examined by Ma 
and Wright (2010) and the setting I examine.  First, specific governance mechanisms 
prompted divergence in their study; no such mechanisms prompt divergence with respect 
to foreign direct investment decisions.  Second, consider the assumption that efficient 
managerial markets, characterized by good corporate governance and low corruption, 
weeds out irrational managers; my sample is Latin American, and Latin America 
consistently rates worse on both corruption and corporate governance indexes than the 
U.S. (GMI, 2011; WorldBank, 2012).  Goto (2007) documents billion dollar decisions 
made by firms that were clearly subject to behavioral biases, before offering a two-
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pronged prevention strategy – first, acknowledge that your managers are likely subject to 
subconscious biases, and second, implement appropriate compensatory governance 
offsets; the lack of common foreign direct investment-specific mechanisms combined 
with less efficient overall governance suggests a potentially increased role for behavioral 
heuristics.  Hagigi and Sivakumar (2009) similarly note the capacity for governance 
mechanisms and behavioral heuristics to interact, before ultimately concluding, "There is 
an increased awareness in practice that incorporating the behavioral considerations is 
necessary in effectively managing risk" (p. 291).  Either way, here too logic suggests that 
the absence of ameliorating mechanisms may result in a greater susceptibility to the 
subconscious influence of cognitive heuristics as opposed to a purely unbiased, cold, 
calculative rationality, when making decisions.  Third, consider calculative versus 
emotive modes of decision making, with calculative decision making being associated 
with rationality and emotive decision making associated with less rational feelings or gut 
instincts; Latin America consistently scores higher on scales of emotive culture relative to 
the U.S. (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998). 
Finally, I do not claim that prospect theory applies to all managers, or that this 
study is definitive.  I merely claim that prospect theory applies to some managers.  (My 
goal is not to test the extent to which prospect theory affects managers; I merely wish to 
use its impact on the managers it does affect to tease escape-based motives out from the 
broader set of traditional motives.) If my hypotheses are supported, while not definitive, 
they may constitute an interesting first step.  
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CHAPTER 3:  HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Escape Motive and FDI Propensity 
The chain of logic in this dissertation thus far, supported at each explicitly listed 
step by scholarly literature, real world examples, and accompanying theoretical logic, 
was as follows: (1) Institutions matter, in that they affect firm performance and, in a 
preemptive bid to avoid negative performance outcomes, firm conduct.  (2) With respect 
to institutions, this includes host country institutions and their degree of alignment 
(institutional misalignment) with multinational enterprise efforts to operate efficiently.  
(3) With respect to firm conduct, it includes internationalization decisions.  (4) The 
specific decision to move abroad in order to escape from home countries characterized by 
institutional misalignment is no exception to this general multinational enterprise desire 
to operate efficiently.  (5) Most associated studies, however, are qualitative in nature 
(with limited generalizability), and those that are not typically examine theorized 
covariates with internationalization (e.g., bureaucracy and outward foreign direct 
investment, or labor regulations and offshoring) and then simply assume escape was the 
motive, without definitively ruling out or explicitly accounting for potentially 
overlapping traditional foreign direct investment motives.  (6) A natural experiment 
based research design combined with a prospect theory lens may help disentangle 
traditional foreign direct investment motives (based on gain-seeking abroad) and escape-
based motives (based on avoiding loss at home).  The suitability of a prospect theory lens 
is contingent upon literature – which I have referred to – that suggests that (7) decisions 
are often driven by behavioral heuristics like prospect theory, and this includes decisions 
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made (8) by groups of people (9) within firms, (10) including decisions specifically 
related to multinational enterprise internationalization, e.g., foreign direct investment. 
Based on this 10-step argument, I now offer several specific prospect theory-
informed foreign direct investment scenarios and accompanying hypotheses.  Figure 6 
depicts either a continuation of, or one of two possible departures from, equilibrium 
(under the assumption that changes in a firm’s current or potential operating  
 
environments may spur changes in firm conduct.)  Three possible institutional states exist 
– deteriorating, static, and improving – for both home countries (on the X axis) and host 
countries (on the Y axis).  A hypothesized move from one state to the next state results in 
a gain or loss of plus or minus one category, relative to the initial category. 
For example, a firm moving from a neutral institutional environment to an 
improving one has presumably made a categorical jump (from equilibrium) equal to plus 
one, while a firm moving from a deteriorating environment to an improving one has 
made a categorical jump equal to plus two.   
   HOME  
 Institutional 
Alignment 







Improving 0 +1 +2 
Static -1 0 +1 
Deteriorating -2 -1 0 
Figure 6.  Prospect Theory Suggests Examining Mathematically Similar Scenarios 
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Note that moves from deteriorating to static countries and from static to 
improving countries each result in a categorical jump of plus one, while moves from 
deteriorating to deteriorating countries or from static to static countries result in a 
categorical change of zero.  Prospect theory predicts that mathematically similar 
departures from equilibrium will result in heterogeneous outcomes, i.e., the desire to 
avoid loss (due, in this case, to institutional deterioration) is stronger than the desire to 
seek gain.  For example, a $100 gain (or a $10 million gain, for that matter) does not have 
the same value as avoiding a $100 loss (or a $10 million loss), despite the fact that a 
rational economic analysis suggests that the outcomes should be equally valued.  
Similarly, a +1 change in a firm’s institutional environment based on seeking gain will 
not have the same subjective value as a +1 change based on avoiding loss. 
This suggests that roughly homogeneous degrees of institutional change may 
yield heterogeneous FDI decisions (depending on whether the motive is loss-avoidance 
or gain-seeking).  In other words, the type of FDI – either FDI from deteriorating settings 
(to avoid loss at home) or FDI from static settings (to gain profits abroad) – should 
impact the propensity of FDI (the frequency at which we see deals occur).  In short, if it 
is determined that prospect theory is a reasonable tool in terms of its applicability as a 
lens through which we may judge foreign direct investment decisions, then the former 
should be more common than the latter.    
Therefore, based on the previous line of reasoning, and as an answer to Witt and 
Lewin’s (2007) call for scholars to use prospect theory as a lens to analyze categorical 
departures from institutional equilibrium, I propose the following proposition and 
associated hypothesis: 
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P1.   Home country institutional deterioration is a more powerful motivator than 
host country improvement 
H1.  Ceteris paribus, OFDI propensity from deteriorating home settings is 
greater than it is from static settings 
Escape Motives and Deal Characteristics 
I have just suggested that “FDI type” (i.e., whether FDI originates from 
deteriorating or static settings) may help explain the “FDI propensity” (i.e., the likelihood 
of deals occurring), with FDI from deteriorating settings that exceeds FDI from static 
settings (once mathematical outcome equivalence is imposed) reflecting desires on the 
parts of firms to escape from such settings.  If revealed preferences (i.e., ‘actions’ as 
opposed to stated preferences) help us infer that a desire to escape from deteriorating 
institutional settings may, indeed, be a genuine OFDI motive, then several natural follow-
up questions present themselves.  Figure 7 provides a summary of these follow up 
research questions. 
Perhaps the immediate question that comes to mind is whether key characteristics 
of escape-based acquisitions, such as the size of these deals, differ from traditional gain-
based deals.  It is possible, for example, that the same situation that gives rise to the 
escape motive gives rise to related desires that manifest themselves via various deal 
characteristics.  Perhaps escape-based deals from deteriorating settings are qualitatively 
different than deals based on traditional gain-seeking motives. 
On the other hand, it is also quite possible that the desire to escape triggers the 
FDI decision, but once that decision has been made, normal decision-making routines 
kick in.  In other words, while institutional misalignment may spur FDI decisions, deal 
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characteristics may not necessarily differ.  Thus, once we control for traditional FDI 
motives, we might see more frequent deals coming from countries where institutions are 
misaligned with firm goals; but even though there are more deals, each individual deal 
may, nevertheless, look fairly similar in terms of deal size, target size, etc. (as prospective 
deals were evaluated according to similar decision-making schema). 
Prospect theory’s predicted loss aversion suggests that deal characteristics may, 
indeed, differ.  It stands to reason that if decision-makers are loss averse, then firms in 
deteriorating markets will want to extricate themselves in short order, in order to stop the 
bleeding (as avoiding loss is a more powerful motivator than seeking gain).  Thus, 
investing firms with escape motives will prioritize ease of leaving over more extensive 
due diligence relative to gain-seeking firms. (This is not to say speed is more important 
than value.  Only that it is more important to escaping firms than it is to gain-seeking 
firms.  For example, instead of demanding very high levels of value, perhaps solid levels 
will suffice if deals are consummated quickly.) 
The decision-making literature supports this claim, via suggestions that the 
potential for loss leads to feelings of stress among decision makers, which in turn leads to 
faster decision-making, in an attempt to prevent the loss and/or stop the bleeding as 
quickly as possible (e.g., Busemeyer, 1982, 1985; Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; 
Donaldson & Lorsch, 1983; Gray, 1999).  The biology and neuroscience literatures offer 
physical mechanisms that explain how the potential for loss is translated into negative 
feelings and a quickening of decision-speed (e.g., Bechara, Damasio, and Damasio, 2000; 
Damasio, 1994; Loewenstein & Cohen, 2008; Starcke & Brand, 2012).  Finally, the 
management literature offers verification that this is, indeed, what happens, i.e., the 
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prospect for loss results in quicker decision-speed (e.g., Amason & Mooney, 2008; 
Dutton & Duncan, 1987; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011; Teece, 2007). 
In order to test my hypotheses, I examine cross-border acquisitions emanating 
from Latin America (since acquisitions constitute the bulk of foreign direct investment 
activity).  As illustrated in Figure 8, Boone and Mulherin (2007) note that in typical 
deals, activity from private initiation of deals to their public announcement often takes 
much longer than the time from announcement to effective resolution.  In the two 
examples they analyze in detail, this ‘private’ process from initiation to public 
announcement took twice as long as the ‘public’ process from announce to effective dates 
(8 and 12 months in private versus 4 and 6 months in public).  Furthermore, internal firm 
activities – such as those related to search, diligence, decision-making and the garnering 
of approval from pertinent managers and boards of directors – only adds to the time spent 
acquiring firms that goes on behind the scenes, before deals are publicly announced.  
When adding the pre-takeover phase to the private takeover phase, up to 80% or more of 
M&A activity may take place behind closed doors before the public is ever formally 
made aware.  
While some evidence exists to support the notion that firms from deteriorating 
institutional settings attempt to shorten the public-takeover phase (e.g., in my own sample 
the average duration is 50% shorter for escaping firms to complete deals after they are 
announced relative to gain-seeking firms, 31 versus 45 days), my focus is primarily on 
the earlier phases of acquisition, as these seem to be where the most impactful time 
savings may be found.  I thus suggest that firms with escape-motives will seek to reduce 
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(2) Does having an escape motive 
affect deal characteristics? 
If the desire to escape from institutionally 
misaligned settings is a genuine FDI 
motive, then perhaps escape-based deals 
look different than traditional deals.   
On the other hand, perhaps established 
decision-making processes and routines 
kick in once decisions to invest abroad are 
made, i.e., while deal propensity changes, 
deal characteristics do not. 
(3) Does the degree of institutional 
change matter to escaping firms? 
Motive may matter (i.e., escaping firms may 
prefer different deals than non-escaping firms).  
But does the degree of change matter when 
comparing escaping firms with each other? 
For example, do firms that escape from 
institututional settings with high levels of 
deterioration prefer different types of deals than 
firms that escape from more moderately 
deteriorating settings? 
(4) Does the degree of change 
matter more for escaping firms 
(deterioration at home) vs. firms 
with traditional FDI motives 
(improvement abroad)? 
After determining the effect of the degree of 
change on escaping firms, we can compare it 
to the effect of the degree of change on firms 
with traditional FDI motives. 
(Theoretically inconsistent single effects 
require discrete analysis.) 
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the time needed to gain internal approval to make offers (shortening the pre-takeover 
phase), and also reduce the time needed to convince sellers to formally accept offers 
(shortening the private-takeover phase).  M&A research suggests that certain deal 
characteristics are associated with shorter takeover periods.  
Faster internal approval (i.e., approval from firm stakeholders to proceed with the 
deal) is related to less aggressive acquisition strategies and smaller deal sizes (more 
aggressive deals, i.e., growth- rather than value-oriented deals, and larger deals 
involve more scrutiny and require greater amounts of lobbying and preparation) (Baum & 
Wally, 2003; Gole & Morris, 2007).  Faster external approval (i.e., obtaining acceptance 
of an offer from a target), meanwhile, is related to: higher premiums paid (the sweeter the 
offer, the quicker the acceptance), friendly target dispositions (hostile deals take longer to 
complete), and private ownership (public firms take longer to make decisions due to 
additional degrees of oversight, e.g., board of director or regulatory scrutiny, and higher 
degrees of formalization) (Dikova, Sahib, & Van Witteloostuijn, 2009; Reed, Lajoux, 
&Nesvold; Simon, 1976).  Choosing bigger targets with high market valuations and large 
amounts of tangible assets may facilitate quicker consummations via both internal and 
external channels, by garnering easier internal approval (versus the acquisition of smaller, 
    Pre Takeover                          Private Takeover                          Public Takeover 
        Process                                  Process                      Process 
Internal                 Private                                Public            Resolution 
Activity               Initiation               Announcement 
Source:  Adapted from Boone and Mulherin (2007) 
Figure 8.  Merger and Acquisitions Timeline 
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highly unfamiliar targets) and quicker external acceptance (due to the greater likelihood 
of larger firms having routines and perhaps even M&A departments in place) (Boone & 
Mulherin , 2007; Gole & Morris, 2007; Reed et al., 2007).   
Combining prospect theory’s prediction of loss aversion with the M&A 
literature’s suggestions with regard to deal characteristics that are associated with quicker 
deals prompts me to propose the following: 
P2.    Firms from deteriorating settings (where FDI Type reflects a desire 
to escape) will emphasize the speed of deals (i.e., they will seek 
deals that facilitate quicker internal approval and/or external 
acceptance) 
H2.    Seeking faster internal approval of proposed investments, escape-
based OFDI is related to less aggressive acquisition strategies (DV 
to aggregate target profitability) 
H3.    Seeking faster internal approval of proposed investments, escape 
based OFDI is related to less aggressive acquisition strategies (DV 
to per share target profitability) 
H4.    Seeking faster external acceptance of proposed investments, escape-
based OFDI is related to higher premiums paid 
H5.    Seeking faster external acceptance of proposed investments, escape-
based OFDI is related to friendly target dispositions 
H6.    Seeking faster external acceptance of proposed investments, escape-
based OFDI is related to private target ownership 
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H7.    Seeking both faster internal approval and external acceptance of 
proposed investments, escape-based OFDI is related to larger 
targets 
H8.    Seeking both faster internal approval and external acceptance of 
proposed investments, escape-based OFDI is related to targets with 
higher market capitalizations 
H9.    Seeking both faster internal approval and external acceptance of 
proposed investments, escape-based OFDI is related to smaller 
deals (as a percentage of acquisition size) 
H10.  Seeking both faster internal approval and external acceptance of 
proposed investments, escape-based OFDI is related to lower target 
intangible asset levels 
Degree of Institutional Change and Deal Characteristics 
A second natural follow-up question to whether a desire to escape institutional 
change at home affects FDI conduct is whether the degree of change matters.  While 
Figure 6’s mathematical equivalence matrix is a useful conceptual tool that helps 
illustrate how prospect theory may serve as a useful lens (yielding testable predictions 
with respect to whether escape based foreign direct investment is a real phenomenon), it 
does have one possible blind spot.  Categorical jumps based on a categorical direction of 
change (e.g., improving, deteriorating) do not consider precise magnitudes of change 
within categories.  For example, one country may experience a 10% deterioration in 
terms of its institutional quality, as measured by various rating agencies, while another 
country may experience a 30% deterioration.  In both cases, however, the categorical 
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change is minus one, despite the fact that one country deteriorated twice as much, on a 
percentage basis, as the other.  As studies of institutional effects on foreign direct 
investment suggest that multinational enterprises consider the magnitude of change as 
well (e.g., previously listed elasticity studies associated with various levels of taxation by 
Bénassy-Quéré and colleagues), I now turn my attention to how degrees of change should 
impact these decisions. 
Here, I am not comparing firms with escape versus traditional FDI motives.  Here 
I simply ask, for example: will it matter if institutions deteriorate by 30% as opposed to 
10%?  Does the degree of change matter when comparing one escaping firm to another 
escaping firm? 
As Figure 5 shows, the slope of the value function for losses is steep.  This 
implies that the amount of discomfort associated with loss increases quite rapidly as 
losses mount.  As larger institutional deteriorations are presumably associated with the 
potential for larger losses, this in turn suggests that the strength of escape motives, i.e., 
the desire to escape, will strengthen.  Thus, I predict that when institutional situations at 
home severely deteriorate, firms will, indeed, be even more motivated to leave than when 
the deterioration is more modest.  The picture, however, is a bit more complex than 
simply assuming that the desire for a speedy exit is amplified.  The literature suggests 
that there is another factor to consider: the chance to recoup large economic loss. 
One key prediction of prospect theory is that as losses magnify, firms eventually 
become risk-seekers (Kahneman & Tversky, 1992).  Kahneman and Tversky (1992) 
famously note the “well-known observation that the tendency to bet on long shots 
increases in the course of the betting day provides some support for the hypothesis that a 
59 
failure to adapt to losses or to attain an expected gain induces risk seeking" (p. 286).  
Thaler and Johnson (1990) notice something subtle, but very important, about Kahneman 
and Tversky’s (1992) empirical evidence, and also about their horse track example: 
The empirical demonstrations of risk seeking in the presence of 
losses provided by Kahneman and Tversky were always accompanied by 
an opportunity to get back to the original reference or "break-even" point. 
We believe that this is very important…gambles, which offer the 
opportunity to break even, will be found acceptable.  
  
In analyzing the influence of break-even effects, the race track 
example cited by Kahneman and Tversky is quite instructive. Notice that 
neither a shift toward risk seeking nor the failure to adapt to losses is 
sufficient to explain the preference toward betting on long shots at the end 
of the betting day. A risk-seeking bettor who is behind by (say) $30 could 
bet $30 on an even money favorite as a method of getting even. However, 
the increased loss aversion produced by prior losses may render this 
strategy unappealing. A $2 bet on a 15-1 long shot offers a more attractive 
chance at breaking even because it does not risk losing significantly more 
money. 
 
More generally, we expect that when prior losses are present, 
gambles which offer the prospect of changing the sign of the status of the 
current account will be treated differently from those which do not. There 
are several reasons, a priori, to expect options which offer the opportunity 
to "break even" to be different. First, these gambles allow the decision 
maker to cancel, or ignore, part of the outcomes. As Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) argue, cancellation supplies decision makers with an 
appealing way of reducing problem complexity. When breaking even is 
possible, integration is facilitated; thus, risk seeking in the domain of 
losses should occur. (p. 656) 
 
In other words, there is something especially motivating about gambles that have 
the potential to help investors erase large losses.  Referring to investments made by 
managers in particular, Thaler and Johnson (1990) are clear: “Also, when options present 
the opportunity to ‘break even’, tendencies toward risk-seeking in the domain of losses 
might be enhanced…when there is a hope, however dim, that one might eradicate 
existing losses” (p. 656). 
60 
Again, the decision-making, psychology, biology, and neuroscience literatures 
provide pathways leading from the prospect for loss towards a tendency for risk-seeking 
in an attempt to prevent, or make up for, this loss.  The basic path is as follows:  the 
degree of loss is directly related to the degree of stress and anxiousness felt by decision-
makers, which, in turn, is directly related to the intensity of motivation towards action 
(Bechara et al., 2000; Busemeyer, 1982, 1985; Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Damasio, 
1994; Donaldson & Lorsch, 1983; Gray, 1999; Loewenstein & Cohen, 2008; Starcke & 
Brand, 2012).  Just as before, the broader management literature affirms this predicted 
relationship.  Das and Teng (2001) note that empirical studies showing that decision 
makers weigh losses about twice as much as gains prompts risk-seeking conduct in an 
attempt to recoup losses.  Das and Teng (2001) go on to note that managers report taking 
less risk when their companies are performing well (MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986; 
March & Shapira, 1987; Shapira, 1995), that “strategic decision making is strongly 
affected by the positive or negative framing of decision scenarios”, and that, in short, 
“troubled firms tend to take more risk” (p. 519). 
 This suggests that while a desire for quickly completed deals may assert itself 
when managers first face institutional situations that may lead to loss, as situations 
worsen and potential losses mount, the desire to break even becomes stronger and 
stronger.  Thus, I predict that firms in environments where institutions have degraded 
markedly will adopt more aggressive investment strategies, by seeking targets that are a 
bit more innovative, with higher earnings ‘upside’, as opposed to focusing primarily on 
safer, conventional blue-chip companies.  Invoking Rahm Emanuel’s maxim, “never let a 
crisis go to waste”, advocates of such deals will take advantage of institutional crisis (and 
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associated “we have to do something” attitudes) to gain internal acceptance of more 
aggressive deals.   
Note that I do not suggest that managers will chase risky upstarts.  The goal is not 
to chase firms that are extremely innovative (i.e., full-fledged explorers), but to acquire 
innovative firms that can quickly monetize innovation (i.e., innovative exploiters).  The 
goal is high upside earnings, relative soon. 
I therefore predict that the degree of change will reflect this rising importance of 
trying to break even, meaning firms will gamble when the situation at home looks 
especially poor.  To be clear, I do not expect managers to gamble wildly (i.e., they will 
not ignore economic fundamentals); but when they see potentially lucrative deals that are 
‘good enough’, they will be more likely to gamble relative to managers in firms whose 
institutional settings are less dire.  This means moving more towards aggressive 
investments in an attempt to break even with perceived economic losses. 
In summary, for deal characteristics without a “breakeven” component, I expect 
that the originally predicted desire for deals that can be completed quickly will strengthen 
as the degree of institutional deterioration strengthens.  For deals with a possible “break 
even” component, however, I expect firms to exhibit more aggressive internationalization 
behavior, with deal characteristics reflecting this change in attitude. 
In order to bridge this sentiment with testable predictions, I examine pertinent 
literature.  Literature suggests that there is a sweet spot in terms of size when it comes to 
the capacity for exploitative innovation.  Very small firms might be highly innovative, 
but at a more exploratory stage (Jansen et al., 2006).  Thus, while I earlier predicted that 
escaping firms would show a general preference for smaller targets (reflecting a desire to 
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facilitate quick deals), I now predict that as degrees of institutional degradation get 
worse, firms balance their desire for quick escapes with their desire to seek riskier deals 
in an attempt to break even.  This means that they will likely seek targets that are larger 
than before.  Public funding (associated with larger R&D budgets and higher degrees of 
monetizing new products) and intangible assets (e.g., patents) are also related to 
exploitative innovation (Jansen et al., 2006); here we see a case where my predicted 
escape-based motive serves an antecedent of the traditional asset-exploitation motive 
associated with the traditional market-seeking FDI motive. 
More aggressive investment strategies, with firms focusing more on the upside 
potential of acquisitions than on safety or value (e.g., seeking targets with higher 
multiples of deal value to earnings), are also likely to be favored (Das & Teng, 2001; 
Thaler & Johnson, 1990). Thus, I predict direct relationships between these 
characteristics and the degree of institutional change. 
Deal size – as a percentage of acquirer size – and friendly target dispositions seem 
to lack obvious break-even potential. Thus, I predict that the original emphasis on 
facilitating speedy deals will remain the primary focus, with degree of change amplifying 
this desire.  (In fact, given Thaler & Johnson’s [1990] suggestion that smaller “long-
shots” may be favored over larger investments, perhaps firms will now have two reasons 
to prefer smaller deals.)  Finally, the desire to buy firms with high earnings potentials, 
while also facilitating quick acceptance, suggests a direct relationship between premiums 
and degree of change.  Thus, I suggest the following: 
P3.     The degree of change matters, i.e., it is directly related to deal 
characteristics with the potential to offer firms the ability to recoup 
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perceived losses, and where no 'breakeven' component exists, it is 
directly related to deal speed 
H11.  Higher degrees of institutional deterioration at home are associated 
with larger targets 
H12.  Higher degrees of institutional deterioration at home are associated 
with targets with higher market capitalizations 
H13.  Higher degrees of institutional deterioration at home are associated 
with targets with public target ownership 
H14.  Higher degrees of institutional deterioration at home are associated 
with targets with higher levels of target intangible asset ownership 
H15.  Higher degrees of institutional deterioration at home are associated 
with targets with more aggressive investment strategies (with 
respect to aggregate target profits) 
H16.  Higher degrees of institutional deterioration at home are associated 
with targets with more aggressive investment strategies (with 
respect to per-share target profits) 
H17.  Higher degrees of institutional deterioration at home are associated 
with targets with smaller relative deal sizes 
H18.  Higher degrees of institutional deterioration at home are associated 
with targets with friendly target dispositions 
H19.  Higher degrees of institutional deterioration at home are associated 
with targets with higher premiums 
64 
Type of Institutional Change as a Moderator of Degree of Change and Deal 
Characteristics 
Here I examine whether the degree of change for escaping firms (based on loss-
avoidance motives) is more important than the degree of change for firms with traditional 
FDI motives (based on the prospect of gain).  In short, as PT suggests that loss aversion is 
a stronger motive than gain seeking, I expect that degrees of change matter more for 
firms seeking to escape a deteriorating home environment than for firms seeking gain 
abroad.  In other words, I expect each of the hypothesized effects from the previous 
section to be stronger for escaping firms than they are for those seeking-gain.  Thus, I 
propose the following: 
P4.     The degree of change matters more for firms from deteriorating 
settings than it does for firms from static settings 
H20.  The prediction that higher degrees of institutional deterioration at 
home are associated with larger targets will be stronger for firms 
with an escape motive versus firms with gain-seeking motives 
H20.  The prediction that higher degrees of institutional deterioration at 
home are associated with larger targets will be stronger for firms 
with an escape motive versus firms with gain-seeking motives 
H21.  The prediction that higher degrees of institutional deterioration at 
home are associated with targets with higher market capitalizations 
will be stronger for firms with an escape motive versus firms with 
gain-seeking motives 
H22.  The prediction that higher degrees of institutional deterioration at 
home are associated with targets with public target ownership will 
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be stronger for firms with an escape motive versus firms with gain-
seeking motives 
H23.  The prediction that higher degrees of institutional deterioration at 
home are associated with targets with higher levels of target 
intangible asset ownership will be stronger for firms with an escape 
motive versus firms with gain-seeking motives 
H24.  The prediction that higher degrees of institutional deterioration at 
home are associated with targets with more aggressive investment 
strategies (with respect to aggregate target profits) will be stronger 
for firms with an escape motive versus firms with gain-seeking 
motives 
H25.  The prediction that higher degrees of institutional deterioration at 
home are associated with targets with more aggressive investment 
strategies (with respect to per-share target profits) will be stronger 
for firms with an escape motive versus firms with gain-seeking 
motives 
H26.  The prediction that higher degrees of institutional deterioration at 
home are associated with targets with smaller relative deal sizes 
will be stronger for firms with an escape motive versus firms with 
gain-seeking motives 
H27.  The prediction that higher degrees of institutional deterioration at 
home are associated with targets with friendly target dispositions 
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will be stronger for firms with an escape motive versus firms with 
gain-seeking motives 
H28.  The prediction that higher degrees of institutional deterioration at 
home are associated with targets with higher premiums will be 
stronger for firms with an escape motive versus firms with gain-
seeking motives 
Figure 9 provides a conceptual model that summarizes my 4 major propositions 
and 28 associated hypotheses.  I will now describe how I plan to empirically test each of 
these proposed links. 
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CHAPTER 4:  RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Research Design 
In an attempt to facilitate clear understanding and prevent the reflexive adoption 
of assumptions pertinent to other studies, but less pertinent when adopting a prospect 
theory-based lens, I will first explain what this study is not.   
First, it is not a study of prospect theory; it merely uses one of its key predictions 
as a lens.  Thus, I do not describe or implement prospect theory in its full mathematical 
splendor, replete with precisely plotted value functions or explicit probability weights 
attached to specific FDI decisions.   
Second, I am not searching for new independent variables, hoping to add a bit of 
incremental validity to existing foreign direct investment models. 
Third, I am also not suggesting that foreign direct investment from ‘D’ settings 
(deteriorating) is more likely to go to static settings (or to other deteriorating settings) 
than to improving settings (or, in a static analysis, to simply the best institutional setting 
available).  I do not believe this to be true, and it is not the point of my test.   
To be clear: the goal of this dissertation is not to predict where foreign direct 
investment will go.  I am merely saying that by purposely limiting the my scope of my 
examination (i.e., by comparing only foreign direct investment that does go from either 
‘D’ or 'S' settings to settings with similar magnitudes of categorical change), I can create 
a test that may help us determine (via an examination of revealed, as opposed to stated, 
preferences) if ‘escape’ is, indeed, a genuine motive for foreign direct investment for 
some firms.  And while this test is not definitive, it does represent an interesting first step 
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that moves us beyond current analyses based on case studies or on empirical approaches 
that do not attempt to account for traditional FDI motives. 
The second element of my research design involves the adoption of a natural 
experiment based approach.  Social scientists are often envious of medical researchers in 
labs, who are often able to rely upon simple T-Tests or Anova based analyses.  Quite 
simply, there is no need for more advanced statistical methods due to the strength of their 
research designs.  The common belief is that this approach is superior to approaches that 
resort to statistically controlling for confounds.  Unfortunately, this approach is often 
unavailable to social scientists whose jobs often require the examination of 'messy, real 
world’ secondary data.  As I believe I have found a way to implement an experimental 
research design while examining macro-level data, controls are thus handled primarily 
via this design rather than via statistical methods. 
Consider Fraker and Maynare (1987) and Lalonde (1986), who convinced many 
social scientists that their ability to control for confounds via statistical methods was an 
illusion, hence the wholesale shift – a shift not emulated by most management scholars – 
towards natural experiment (and quasi-experiment) based studies (Shadish et al., 2002).  
For example, social scientists may exploit naturally occurring changes in legal or 
economic policy, either across time in the same location or at the same time across the 
borders of two locations, “as if” they had structured these changes in order to purposely 
conduct an experiment.  The key is that one time or place (the period or place of change) 
serves as a proxy for an experimental “treatment”, while the other time or place (the 
period or place where change did not occur) serves as a “control”.  The goal is to emulate 
lab experiments (with the added realism inherent in field studies), where research 
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designs, rather than post-hoc statistical controls, do the heavy lifting with regard to 
potentially confounding variables or reverse causality. 
According to the Research Methods Knowledge Base (Trochim, 1999: 193), 
"experimental designs are often touted as the most 'rigorous' of all research designs or, as 
the 'gold standard' against which all other designs are judged".  One key feature of these 
designs is their ability to increase the odds that: (a) treatment and control group 
characteristics will be matched (i.e., equivalent), and (b) any residual mismatches will be 
due to chance rather than due to systemic heterogeneity.  As a result of their ability to 
dampen, or even eliminate, the effects of omitted variable bias, such studies are thought 
to have much stronger internal validity than the "correlational" studies typically 
employed by business professors. 
As researchers conducting natural experiments lack the degree of control 
possessed by scientists in a lab, the likelihood that treatment and control groups are 
equivalent is somewhat less than it might be had researchers possessed full control with 
respect to the random assignment of treatments.  Thus, more conservative researchers 
employing this type of experimental design often conduct explicit checks of equivalence 
to ensure that group equivalence has, indeed, been obtained (and if mismatches do 
remain, they are acknowledged, corrected via reassignments, statistically controlled for, 
and/or explicitly modeled) (Angrist et al., 2002; Bloom, 2010; Warner, 2008).  These 
checks for equivalence become even more important when designs possess quasi-
experimental characteristics, i.e., designs where the degree of random assignment to 
treatment and control groups is not unquestionably assured (even when assignments are 
completely free from researcher influence), or is even absent entirely. 
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In a recent Journal of International Business Studies “From the Editors” piece, 
Reeb, Sakakibara, and Mahmood (2012: 212) admonish the field for its reflexive 
overreliance upon “observational data” and “cross-sectional regressions to make 
inferences about the treatment effect”.  They suggest natural experiments produce more 
trustworthy results, and then go on to describe how a negative regulatory shock may 
serve as a treatment period that can be compared to a control period not subject to the 
shock, providing “ideal test environments”. 
I examine such a shock in this study, via the employment of a special type of 
natural experiment that is less prone to such issues: the case-crossover design, developed 
by Harvard epidemiologists Maclure and Mittleman (1991).  The term 'crossover' refers 
to the fact that all subjects pass through (i.e., cross over) both treatment and control 
phases before group counts or means are compared.  (In this case, the same set of firms in 
each country experiences both a deteriorating institutional phase and an institutionally 
static phase.)  The explicit purpose of this design is to control for non-focal differences 
between control and treatment groups (i.e., omitted variables).  As each subject 
effectively serves as its own control before the standard group mean comparison takes 
place, the New England Journal of Medicine's "Medical Uses of Statistics" (Louis et al., 
1992: 95) claims that "this pairing (of a subject with itself) represents the ultimate form 
of statistical adjustment". 
At its core, the design involves the examination of the same set of firms (thus 
making this a case-crossover design) within temporally adjacent, spatially identical 
settings in Latin America.  In other words, I compare the foreign direct investment 
behavior of: 
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• The same group of firms that have been exposed to a changing 
institutional setting (to attenuate firm/industry effects) 
• Within the same countries (to attenuate country effects) 
• During periods of institutional transition that border neutral periods 
(serving as treatment and control periods) 
• Irrespective of temporal precedence (in order to account for the global 
trend of foreign direct investment increasing over the years) 
For example, I compare outward foreign direct investment from Colombia during 
1980-1985 (when labor institutions were ‘deteriorating’) with Colombian outward 
foreign direct investment during 1985-1990 (when these same institutions were ‘static’), 
while imposing mathematical similarity according to my prospect theory-derived 
predictions (e.g., destinations in each case that similarly represent a +1 change).  
Similarly, if institutions in Brazil (or any other Latin American country) deteriorated 
during any five-year treatment period that bordered a static five year control period, I 
compared outward foreign direct investment from those adjacent periods as well. 
Despite the acknowledged strength of case-crossover designs in terms of their 
ability to control for group differences, as a precautionary measure I chose to conduct T-
tests (for quantitative variables) and Fisher's Exact Test (for categorical variables) to 
verify that common antecedents of internationalization did not differ by subsample (i.e., 
firms in deteriorating setting were compared with firms in static home settings).  I 
compared the two groups with respect to 16 measures of four attributes that the 
internationalization literature (e.g., Hitt et al.'s 2006 meta-analysis) has identified as 
antecedents of FDI activity: 
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• T-tests were conducted to verify that firm size was equivalent (specific 
measures included net sales, net income, net assets, total assets, EBIT, 
EBITDA) 
• T-tests were conducted to verify that the capability of firms to expand 
(typically measured via proxies for liquidity or monetary capability) was 
equivalent (specific measures included current assets as a percentage of 
the preceding size measures) 
• T-tests were conducted to verify that firm experience was equivalent 
(specific measures included dummy coded variables dependent upon 
whether firms had conducted past deals in the host country, in the same 
industry, or both)  
• Fisher's Exact Test was conducted for these same dummy-coded macro-
level industry variables, to determine if industry composition differed by 
subsample 
None of the test statistics was statistically significant at the .05 level (the average 
p-value was .35), indicating that there were no mismatches between the treatment and 
control groups.  I thus concluded that the samples were equivalent with respect to 
variables that the literature suggests that researchers control for (beyond the four 
traditional FDI motives, whose influence is accounted for via theoretically derived 
samples according to PT informed predictions). 
In a future critique of this design, Maclure and Mittleman (2000) warn that the 
design applies best if treatments and effects are clear, discrete, and abrupt, and if the 
effect on risk is immediate.  This study meets each of these ideal conditions of suitability: 
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examined institutional changes happen within a single period (as opposed to creeping 
changes over a series of decades), its applicability in each case is immediate, and the 
proposed outcome of escape is discrete and abrupt (with a firm either staying or 
escaping). 
Data and Measures 
Despite a recent downturn in global mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity, 
M&As have historically accounted for the lion’s share of historical foreign direct 
investment activity (for example, according to UNCTAD data, during the 20 years 
between 1987 and 2006, M&A activity as a share of global IFDI averaged over 75% and 
dipped below 50% only once).  Thus, I chose to examine M&A activity instead of 
greenfield ventures, pulling data from Thomson One’s Mergers and Acquisitions 
database.   
Latin America was the fastest growing region in the world in terms of both inward 
and outward foreign direct investment in 2009 [ECLAC, 2010].  While the temporal 
scope of this test included deals announced during 1986-2005, this recent upsurge, 
combined with a relative lack of Latin American focused studies, prompted me to choose 
to examine Latin America. 
In line with much of the literature on how institutions affect the conduct or 
performance of multinational enterprises (e.g., Banalieva & Dhanaraj, 2013; Phene & 
Tallman, 2012), data on institutions was obtained via a central, normalized index 
compiled by the Fraser Institute that measures institutional quality in various categories, 
e.g., legal institutions, financial institutions, etc. (Gwartney et al., 2012).  Data is 
provided for countries on a rolling five-year basis.  My sample included data from 1986 
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to 2005.  Ultimate sources of data that the Fraser Institute relied upon to construct their 
index include databases commonly utilized by IB scholars, e.g., databases created and 
maintained by the IMF, the United Nations, the World Bank, etc. 
Institutional changes that occurred in periods of deterioration that bordered static 
periods were observed in the following areas: Bureaucracy Costs, Hiring and Firing 
Rules, Price Controls, Credit Market Regulations, Private Credit, Government Size, 
Impartial Courts, Judicial Independence, Legal System Integrity, Political/Military Risk, 
Property Rights, Banking Regulation, Foreign Currency Rules, Interest Rate Controls, 
Monetary Soundness, Money Growth, and Trade Regulations.  Table 3 provides a 
detailed description of these institutional categories and an inventory of the ultimate 
sources of data that the Fraser Institute consulted to create its measures of institutional 
quality. 
Traditional foreign direct investment motives (e.g., market-seeking foreign direct 
investment) are accounted for by my prospect theory centered methodology, which 
assumes that these motives coexist with escape-based motives, i.e., motives either exist 
simultaneously, or once the decision to escape has been made, traditional motives exert 
themselves then.  (For example, once a firm decides to invest abroad, it may naturally 
consider destinations with lucrative markets or key natural resources.) 
Under the supposition that institutional deterioration leads to misalignment (Witt 
and Lewin, 2007), categories are defined as follows: a 10% improvement or decrease in 
the Fraser Institute’s respective institutional index score will result in the labeling of a 
country’s institutions as improving or deteriorating respectively, while a change of less  
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Table 3 
Description of Institutions and Sources 





This is a survey-based measure of 
firms' assessments of how 
burdensome regulations related to 
products, services, energy use, and 
non-environmental are in a given 
country. 






This measures the degree of labor 
market rigidity in a country with 
respect to a firm's level of 
autonomy in terms of its ability to 
hire or fire employees. 
World Economic Forum Global 
Competitiveness Report 
 Price Controls This measures the degree to which 
governments interfere with the 
ability of a firm to autonomously 
set prices via the formal 
specification of allowable prices 
for goods or services (e.g., price 
floors, price ceilings). 
International Institute for Management 
Development World Competitiveness 
Yearbook, Price Waterhouse Doing Business In 
series, World Bank Adjustment in Africa: 
Reforms, Results, and the Road Ahead (1994), 
Economist Intelligence Unit EIU Country 
Reports and Country Commerce (2001), US 
   (table continues) 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Description of Institutions and Sources 
 
Domain Specific Area Description Ultimate Data Sources 
Business 
Regulations 
  State Department Country Commercial Guides 
and Country Reports on Economic Policy and 
Trade Practices 
Financial Credit Market 
Regulations 
This is a broad measure of how 
well developed and free from 
government interference a 
country's credit markets are. 
World Bank World Development Indicators, 
International 
Monetary Fund International Financial 
Statistics, Bank Regulation and Supervision 
(Barth, Caprio & Levine, various years), 
Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels 
Govern (Barth, Caprio & Levine, 2006) 
Financial Private Credit This is a measure of the extent to 
which government borrowing 
crowds out borrowing by firms. 
World Bank World Development Indicators, 
International 
Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics 
Fiscal Government 
Size 
Measures the degree that countries 
rely on political processes to 
allocate resources (including 
goods and services). Increased 
government spending (relative to 
private spending) results in 
government decision-making and 
spending crowding out private 
autonomy and spending. 
World Bank World Development Indicators, 
International Monetary Fund International 
Financial Statistics, United Nations National 
Accounts 
   (table continues) 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Description of Institutions and Sources 
 
Domain Specific Area Description Ultimate Data Sources 
Legal Impartial Courts This measures the degree of 
neutrality, efficiency, and lack of 
corruption with respect to a 
country's legal framework for 
private dispute settlement and the 
ability of firms to challenge the 
legality of government actions 
and/or regulations. 
World Economic Forum Global 
Competitiveness Report, World Bank 
Worldwide Governance Indicators 
Legal Judicial 
Independence 
This is a measure of how free 
courts are from the influence of 
powerful others, e.g., political 
influence via government agencies 
or officials. 
World Economic Forum Global 
Competitiveness Report 
Legal Legal System 
Integrity 
This measure consists of two 
components related to law and 
order.  The ‘law’ component 
assesses a legal system's degree of 
impartiality and general strength, 
while the ‘order’ component 
assesses popular observance of 
laws. 
PRS Group International Country Risk Guide 
Legal Political/Military 
Risk 
This is a measure of political risk 
that includes the degree of  
PRS Group International Country Risk Guide, 
World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 
   (table continues) 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Description of Institutions and Sources 
 
Domain Specific Area Description Ultimate Data Sources 
  influence that military officials 
have with respect to government 
policies that might affect firms by 
creating an "uneasy" operating 
environment. 
 
Legal Property Rights This is a measure of how well 
specified and secure property 
rights are.  When actors lack 
confidence with respect to 
property rights, investment and 
entrepreneurial activity suffer. 




This is an interval measure of the 
percentage of bank deposits that 
are held in privately owned banks 
within a country.  When countries 
mandate deposits in public 
accounts,  
Bank Regulation and Supervision (Barth, Caprio 
& Levine, various years), Rethinking Bank 
Regulation: Till Angels Govern (Barth, Caprio 
& Levine, 2006) 
Monetary Foreign 
Currency Rules 
This is a measure of the degree of 
restriction with respect to a firm’s 
ability to own foreign currency 
bank accounts both domestically 
and abroad. 
International Monetary Fund Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions 
   (table continues) 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Description of Institutions and Sources 
 
Domain Specific Area Description Ultimate Data Sources 
Monetary Interest Rate 
Controls 
Data on regulations and controls 
related to interest rates is used to 
construct an index measuring the 
degree to which markets determine 
rates, the degree of stability of 
monetary policy, and the degree to 
which real deposit and lending 
rates are positive. 
World Bank World Development Indicators, 




This is a measure of how stable 
monetary institutions are.  
Fluctuating or perpetually low 
monetary value lowers investment 
and entrepreneurial activity by 
undermining confidence in the 
means of exchange, trade, and the 
financing of production. 
World Bank World Development Indicators, 
International 
Monetary Fund International Financial 
Statistics, United Nations National Accounts, 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions 
Monetary Money Growth Excessive monetary growth 
reduces confidence in the means of 
exchange and investment within a 
country, as purchasing power  
World Bank World Development Indicators, 
International 
Monetary Fund International Financial 
Statistics, United Nations National Accounts 
   (table continues) 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Description of Institutions and Sources 
 
Domain Specific Area Description Ultimate Data Sources 
  erodes and planning for the future 
becomes difficult; it also acts as de 





Supply chains today are global.  
Trade restrictions impede the 
ability of firms to compete with 
competitors whose countries lack 
such restrictions.  Firms also suffer 
when the cost of inputs (e.g., 
tariffs increasing a firm's costs of 
acquiring an input) or outputs 
(e.g., tariffs resulting in higher 
prices for consumers may hurt 
sales relative to cheaper 
alternatives) is artificially raised 
beyond optimal levels. 
International Monetary Fund Government 
Finance Statistics Yearbook, International 
Monetary Fund International Financial 
Statistics, World Trade Organization World 
Tariff Profiles, World Economic Forum Global 
Competitiveness Report, World Bank Doing 
Business, MRI Bankers’ Guide to Foreign 
Currency, International Monetary Fund, Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions, Robert Lawson and 
Jayme Lemke, Travel Visas, Public Choice 
(2011) 
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than 5% will result in the labeling of a country’s institutional situation as static.  
Conflicting periods (i.e., periods where heterogeneous institutional states made clear 
categorical assignments difficult, e.g., financial institutions deteriorated while legal 
institutions improved) were excluded.   
Table 4 provides a detailed list of the institutional settings that emerged using this 
criterion.  This approach ultimately yielded 80 distinct periods where institutionally 
deteriorating treatment periods bordered static control periods, resulting in 40 includable 
country dyads (e.g., Colombia from 1991-1995 [when labor institutions were static] and 
Colombia from 1996-2000 [when labor institutions were deteriorating]).  The average 
degree of home country deterioration (for deals that originated from countries with 
deteriorating settings) was 23.1%.  The average degree of change during neutral periods 
was 0%.  The average degree of host country improvement (for deals that originated from 
neutral settings that were bound for improving settings) was 24.9%.   
All M&A deals under examination had announcement dates and home-country 
locations that fell within the domain of these dyads.  (For example, deals from Colombia 
that were announced in either the 1991-1995 time period or the 1996-2000 time period 
were included in the examination, while deals not falling within the domain of a focal 
dyad – e.g., Colombian M&A activity in 1989 – were excluded.)  Investments ultimately 
took place in the following regions: Caribbean, Central America, Eastern Europe, North 
America, South America, South Asia, North Asia, and Western Europe. 
In an attempt to "reduce noise in the data", examinations of M&A activity (e.g., 
Seth, Song & Pettit's 2002 Strategic Management Journal study) typically limit analysis 
to deals where pertinent information with respect to deal characteristics is available and
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Table 4 

















1 Bahamas Caribbean 1991 1995 Monetary Money Growth 0.0% 
1 Bahamas Caribbean 1996 2000 Monetary Money Growth -13.8% 
2 Barbados Caribbean 1991 1995 Monetary Money Growth 2.2% 
2 Barbados Caribbean 1996 2000 Monetary Money Growth -15.1% 
3 Barbados Caribbean 1996 2000 Monetary Money Growth -15.1% 
3 Barbados Caribbean 2001 2005 Monetary Money Growth -2.5% 
4 Bolivia South America 1996 2000 Legal Political/Military Risk -15.3% 
4 Bolivia South America 2001 2005 Legal Political/Military Risk 0.0% 
5 Bolivia South America 1996 2000 Legal Legal System Integrity -28.6% 
5 Bolivia South America 2001 2005 Legal Legal System Integrity 0.0% 
6 Brazil South America 1996 2000 Legal Judicial Independence -1.8% 
6 Brazil South America 2001 2005 Legal Judicial Independence -45.5% 
7 Chile South America 1991 1995 Labor Hiring and Firing Regs 0.0% 
7 Chile South America 1996 2000 Labor Hiring and Firing Regs -18.8% 
8 Chile South America 1996 2000 Legal Political/Military Risk -10.7% 
8 Chile South America 2001 2005 Legal Political/Military Risk 3.0% 
9 Chile South America 1996 2000 Business Regs Price Controls -10.0% 
9 Chile South America 2001 2005 Business Regs Price Controls 0.0% 
10 Colombia South America 1991 1995 Labor Hiring and Firing Regs 0.0% 
10 Colombia South America 1996 2000 Labor Hiring and Firing Regs -23.6% 
11 Costa Rica Central America 1991 1995 Financial Credit Market Regs 4.7% 
11 Costa Rica Central America 1996 2000 Financial Credit Market Regs -13.5% 
      (table continues) 
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Table 4 (Continued) 

















12 Dominican Rep Caribbean 1991 1995 Legal Property Rights -13.5% 
12 Dominican Rep Caribbean 1996 2000 Legal Property Rights 2.2% 
13 Ecuador South America 1986 1990 Legal Property Rights 0.0% 
13 Ecuador South America 1991 1995 Legal Property Rights -15.2% 
14 Ecuador South America 1996 2000 Monetary Monetary Soundness -24.6% 
14 Ecuador South America 2001 2005 Monetary Monetary Soundness -4.1% 
15 Guatemala Central America 1991 1995 Monetary Foreign Currency Regs 0.0% 
15 Guatemala Central America 1996 2000 Monetary Foreign Currency Regs -50.0% 
16 Guatemala Central America 1991 1995 Financial Credit Market Regs 4.9% 
16 Guatemala Central America 1996 2000 Financial Credit Market Regs -15.3% 
17 Guatemala Central America 1996 2000 Trade Trade Regulations -11.1% 
17 Guatemala Central America 2001 2005 Trade Trade Regulations 0.0% 
18 Guatemala Central America 1996 2000 Financial Private Credit -10.4% 
18 Guatemala Central America 2001 2005 Financial Private Credit 3.5% 
19 Guyana South America 1996 2000 Fiscal Government Size -13.6% 
19 Guyana South America 2001 2005 Fiscal Government Size 0.0% 
20 Haiti Caribbean 1996 2000 Legal Property Rights 0.0% 
20 Haiti Caribbean 2001 2005 Legal Property Rights -30.8% 
21 Haiti Caribbean 1996 2000 Financial Private Credit -1.0% 
21 Haiti Caribbean 2001 2005 Financial Private Credit -13.1% 
22 Jamaica Caribbean 1991 1995 Financial Private Credit -11.0% 
22 Jamaica Caribbean 1996 2000 Financial Private Credit 0.0% 
      (table continues) 
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Table 4 (Continued) 

















23 Mexico North America 1986 1990 Monetary Foreign Currency Regs 0.0% 
23 Mexico North America 1991 1995 Monetary Foreign Currency Regs -50.0% 
24 Mexico North America 1996 2000 Business Regs Bureaucy Costs 3.3% 
24 Mexico North America 2001 2005 Business Regs Bureaucy Costs -39.7% 
25 Mexico North America 1996 2000 Legal Impartial Courts 2.0% 
25 Mexico North America 2001 2005 Legal Impartial Courts -26.9% 
26 Nicaragua Central America 1996 2000 Legal Impartial Courts -2.3% 
26 Nicaragua Central America 2001 2005 Legal Impartial Courts -54.8% 
27 Panama Central America 1986 1990 Monetary Money Growth -1.0% 
27 Panama Central America 1991 1995 Monetary Money Growth -10.2% 
28 Panama Central America 1991 1995 Financial Private Credit 0.0% 
28 Panama Central America 1996 2000 Financial Private Credit -10.8% 
29 Panama Central America 1996 2000 Trade Trade Regs -13.2% 
29 Panama Central America 2001 2005 Trade Trade Regs 3.8% 
30 Panama Central America 1996 2000 Legal Legal System Integrity -28.6% 
30 Panama Central America 2001 2005 Legal Legal System Integrity 0.0% 
31 Paraguay South America 1991 1995 Legal Property Rights -4.4% 
31 Paraguay South America 1996 2000 Legal Property Rights -11.6% 
32 Peru South America 1996 2000 Legal Legal System Integrity -28.6% 
32 Peru South America 2001 2005 Legal Legal System Integrity 0.0% 
33 Trinidad & Tob Caribbean 1986 1990 Financial Interest Rate Controls -25.0% 
33 Trinidad & Tob Caribbean 1991 1995 Financial Interest Rate Controls 0.0% 
      (table continues) 
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Table 4 (Continued) 

















34 Trinidad & Tob Caribbean 1996 2000 Legal Impartial Courts -3.1% 
34 Trinidad & Tob Caribbean 2001 2005 Legal Impartial Courts -17.5% 
35 Uruguay South America 1986 1990 Financial Interest Rate Controls 0.0% 
35 Uruguay South America 1991 1995 Financial Interest Rate Controls -25.0% 
36 Uruguay South America 1996 2000 Legal Property Rights -1.7% 
36 Uruguay South America 2001 2005 Legal Property Rights -10.5% 
37 Uruguay South America 1996 2000 Financial Banking Regs 0.0% 
37 Uruguay South America 2001 2005 Financial Banking Regs -60.0% 
38 Venezuela Central America 1996 2000 Fiscal Government Size -1.6% 
38 Venezuela Central America 2001 2005 Fiscal Government Size -18.3% 
39 Venezuela Central America 1996 2000 Legal Property Rights -2.6% 
39 Venezuela Central America 2001 2005 Legal Property Rights -16.2% 
40 Venezuela Central America 1996 2000 Labor Hiring and Firing Regs 4.5% 







Figure 10.  Institutional Settings Examined For “Deal Characteristics” Hypotheses (Associated With P2-P4) 
Note:  This is a “full information” subset of the list of settings examined in Table 4.  The institutional settings in this 
subset had cross-border deals take place that met each the following four conditions: 
(1) The acquiring firm’s home country was in a period of institutional deterioration (D) that bordered a 
static (S) institutional period, or vice versa 
(2) The categorical change from D settings and S settings with respect to target country institutional settings 
was set to be equal, e.g., per Figure 6, FDI from D to S settings and from S to improving (I) settings 
both represent a categorical jump of +1 
(3) Deal values were at least 1 million USD in size 
(4) Full information with respect to key financial values (e.g., deal value, net income) was available 
A robustness check on H1 was also performed using deals from this pared sample. 
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deal values meets a certain size threshold (i.e., very small deals are excluded).  I thus 
restricted my examination to transactions where acquiring firms had publicly agreed to 
deals of at least 1 million USD in value.  This ultimately resulted in an initial sample that 
included 548 acquisitions, whose institutional state (deteriorating or static) could be 
compared in order to test Hypothesis 1. 
The sample includes a mix of investments from dyads where deteriorating periods 
preceded static periods, and also from dyads where static periods preceded deteriorating 
periods.  This is important, because as time has gone by, the global economy has become 
more integrated, and firms in emerging markets have become larger and more capable of 
moving abroad.  For example, according to the KOF Index of Globalization (2013), Latin 
America's globalization rating increased from 41% from 1985 to 2005.  The fact that 
deteriorating periods in my sample preceded neutral periods roughly 2/3 of the time 
indicates that any increase in FDI activity was not due to these temporal trends.  (In other 
words, if deteriorating periods consistently occurred after neutral periods, then claims 
that deterioration led to increases in OFDI could be countered with assertions that these 
increases were instead due to the global trend of rising OFDI in recent years.  Thus, the 
tendency in this sample for deteriorating periods to precede neutral periods, when global  
trends strongly suggest that later periods will see increased OFDI activity, provides a 
strong, conservative test of the effect of deterioration on OFDI.) 
In order to test the remaining hypotheses, more detailed financial information was 
required.  I thus restricted my examination here to transactions with fully available net 
income and deal value information.  As a result, many smaller deals, often emanating 
from smaller countries, were excluded.  This subset included 174 deals.  Figure 10 
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visually depicts the subset of dyads from Table 4 that was used to test these hypotheses.  
(H1 was also tested again, using this “full information” subset as opposed to the broader 
set of deals, as a robustness check.) 
I operationalize outward foreign direct investment propensity as the number of 
M&A deals announced during each contiguous time-period.  Theoretically relevant deal 
characteristics were obtained by Thomson One's database, with measures based on 
previous conceptualizations in the literature (e.g., Reed et al., 2007).  Premiums represent 
deal values in excess of a target's current stock-price based valuation on the day of the 
deal.  Public represents whether a target is publicly traded or privately owned (1 = 
public).  Both of these variables are directly provided by Thomson One. 
TargSize represents how large a target is.  This is a latent variable measured by 
Thomson One’s reported figures with respect to the number of employees a target has 
and its total net sales.  DealSize is the value of the deal on the day it was announced, 
relative to the size of the buyer.  This is a latent variable measured by calculating the deal 
value in U.S. dollars as a percentage of an acquirer’s: net assets, total assets, current 
assets, net income, net sales, and EBIT.  Each of these indicators (i.e., deal value as a 
percentage of net assets, deal value as a percentage of net sales, etc.) was calculated via 
direct figures from Thomson One.   
TargIntAss is the level of intangible assets (e.g., patents and other intellectual 
property) owned by the target on the day the deal was announced, as reported by 
Thomson One.  Non-friendly is a dummy variable, with 1 indicating that the target's 
disposition with respect to being acquired – as reported by Thomson One – was either 
hostile or neutral, and 0 indicating that the target's disposition was welcoming.  
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TargMktValue is the target's market capitalization on the day the deal was announced.  
AggBook and AggMarket measure whether or not the acquirer was pursuing a more 
conservative value-oriented purchase strategy or a more aggressive growth-oriented 
strategy.  These variables are operationalized by examining the deal value as a multiple 
of target earnings, either on an aggregate basis (AggBook: deal value as a multiple of net 
income and EBIT) or on a per share basis (AggMarket: deal value as a multiple of 
earnings per share). 
Finally, the degree of change is simply the percent change in a country's 
institutional rating, e.g., if a country’s institutional score in the monetary institutions 
category changes by +20%, then the magnitude of change is +20% (and if the change in a 
country's monetary institutions score is -20%, then the degree of change is noted as -
20%). 
I calculate cumulative D-sourced and S-sourced foreign direct investment using 
the following formulas, where ‘x’ and 'y' represent an individual country in each 




Combining the formulas yields the prediction seen in Figure 11's conceptual 






will exceed the number of FDI deals from static settings (regardless of which period 
occurred first). 
Statistical Methodology 
In order to analyze the data and test my hypotheses, I employed two primary 
statistical methods: a binomial proportionality test and partial least squares (partial least 
squares) analysis.   One problem related to the testing of Hypothesis 1 is potential 
endogeneity associated with the inclusion both FDI Type (a dummy variable indicating 
whether FDI originated from a deteriorating or static environment) and the dependent 
variable, FDI propensity (the number of deals from each environment), in the same path 
model. Overlapping compositional attributes (with one being a function of the number of 
occurrences of the other) generally suggests the use of econometric techniques such as 
the employment of instrumental variables, when they are available.  Due to the lack of 
suitable instruments, I thus employ a binomial proportionality test to determine if 
outward foreign direct investment propensity differs according to foreign direct 
X = FDI from D settings 
Y = FDI from S settings 
X = FDI from D settings 
Y = FDI from S settings 
Figure 11.  Illustrations of Predicted Effect of Misalignment on Firm Conduct 
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investment type.  Kelly et al. (1987), Kumar (2005), Lee and Larwood (1983), 
McDougall and Oviatt (1996), McNamara et al. (1997), Seth et al. (2000), and Wiles and 
Danielova (2009) suggest that binomial proportionality tests are appropriate when 
attempting to determine the statistical significance of deviations from theoretically 
expected distributions of observations into two categories.) 
As this is a bivariate test, I relied upon experimental controls for potential 
confounds.  As noted earlier, T-tests and Fisher's Exact Test verified that samples were 
equivalent with respect to 16 established measures of internationalization antecedents. 
Thus, after verifying sample equivalence with respect to potential confounds, I conducted 
the binomial test.  This helped me achieve my primary goal of determining if institutional 
misalignment motivates escape via a quantitative empirical analysis that accounts for the 
strong likelihood of either simultaneous (or near simultaneous) consideration of 
traditional foreign direct investment motives on the part of decision makers within 
multinational enterprises.  (The test predicts that proportions, under an assumption of 
economic rationality, will be roughly equal given equalized categorical outcomes.  A 
significant p-value (indicating that FDI activity differs according to whether it originates 
from deteriorating versus neutral settings) would support the assertion that motives 
related to the avoidance of loss (i.e., escape motives) do indeed exist. 
After testing for whether escape actually occurs, I delved into the examination of 
hypotheses related to characteristics of escape-based foreign investment.  Here I 
conducted a partial least squares analysis, as it is often deemed appropriate for studies 
that are exploratory in nature and for situations where dichotomous variables are 
employed, and/or researchers wish to maximize prediction over fit (Chin, 1998; Chin, 
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2003; Fey et al., 2008; Lee, at al., 2006; Van Slyke et al., 2007; Yang et al., 2011).  PLS 
is also often recommended for use when sample sizes are relatively small.  For example, 
a common rule of thumb with respect to required sample sizes when conducting analyses 
via partial least squares-based methods suggests a sample of at least 10 times the number 
of paths or indicators of the most predicted construct (Chin, 1998).  As my most 
predicted construct has two paths leading into it (all indicators are reflective), this means 
that, in theory, a sample size as small as 20 might be large enough to detect medium-
sized effects.  As my actual sample size is 174, sample size is not an issue. 
(By comparison, guidelines related to suggested sample sizes when conducting 
analyses based on structural equation modeling approaches suggest the need for much 
larger sample sizes – especially under circumstances similar to those in this examination, 
where experimental controls parse out the effects of potential confounding variables 
[meaning ultimate effect sizes should be smaller].  For example, to detect an effect size of 
.05, in a model with 3 latent variables and 18 observed variables, with a p-value of .05 
and .80 power, a sample size of 1172 is recommended when conducting structural 
equation modeling-based analyses [Cohen, 1988; Soper, 2013; Westland, 2010]). 
I used PLS-Graph 3.0 to generate two path models.  The first model’s primary 
focus, in line with the hypotheses associated with Proposition 2, was to test whether 
having an escape motive changed deal characteristics.  This model also examined the 
effect of the absolute degree of institutional change (either deterioration at home or 
improvement abroad) on deal characteristics. 
The second model examined the subsamples (firms from either deteriorating or 
static home countries) in isolation, in order to determine the effects of the degree of 
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institutional deterioration on deal characteristics (in accordance with the hypotheses 
associated with Proposition 3).  I also wished to determine if OFDI motives associated 
with each subsample (avoiding loss at home due to institutional deterioration, i.e., 
escaping, versus having traditional motives) served as a moderator.  (The prediction is 
that the degree of change mattered more for firms with an escape motive.)  
Question “4” in Figure 7 suggests that discrete analysis is required.  As interaction 
terms produce single effects in lieu of main effects, and single effects assume that the 
partner term (i.e., the other independent variable that is multiplied with the focal variable 
in order to create the interaction term) has a value of zero, the interaction approach does 
not make sense, conceptually.  (Assuming that the degree of change, for example, was 
equal to zero defeats the purpose of examining the impact of change.)  Therefore, I used 
the subgroup analysis approach at determining whether FDI motive moderated the effect 
of institutional change on the deal characteristics under study. 
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CHAPTER 5:  RESULTS 
I offered four basic propositions (the desire to escape deteriorating institutional 
settings is a genuine FDI motive, escape motives affect deal characteristics, degree of 
change matters, and degree of change matters more for escaping firms versus those with 
traditional FDI motives) and 28 associated hypotheses.  In short, I find that escape does 
happen and that it does affect deal characteristics.  I also find that degree does matter.  
Support for my prediction that it matters more for escaping firms is generally supportive 
but ultimately inconclusive.  Results regarding my hypotheses are listed below. 
Escape Prompts OFDI Decisions 
I conducted a binomial proportionality test (with experimental controls for firm, 
industry, country, and temporal effects) to determine if this difference was statistically 
significant.  Binomial tests compare the counts and associated proportions of the 
members of one group versus another.  The complete sample of acquisitions consisted of 
305 deals from deteriorating settings versus 243 deals from static settings, with FDI 26% 
more likely to originate from deteriorating settings. As the p-value generated by the 
proportions test was .001, H1 is clearly supported.  As a robustness check, a binomial 
tests was also conducted on the “full information” subset.  Here, there were 107 deals 
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Figure 13.  Impact of Degree of Change on Firms with Traditional vs. Escape Motives 
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Correlations, Convergent Validity, and Discriminant Validity 




















DegreeCh 1           
Public -0.055 1          
Non-friendly -0.121 0.105 1         
DealSize -0.12 0.081 0.227 0.999        
Premium -0.113 0.097 0.219 -0.073 1       
EscMotive 0.185 -0.096 -0.112 -0.137 0.097 1      
AggBook -0.027 -0.036 -0.002 0.003 -0.184 -0.096 0.876     
AggMarket 0.021 -0.066 -0.101 0.006 -0.216 -0.114 0.072 1    
TargSize 0.272 -0.053 -0.138 -0.089 -0.109 0.289 0.067 -0.002 0.634   
TargMktCap -0.075 -0.194 -0.098 -0.01 0.038 0.093 0.183 0.174 -0.052 1  
TargIntAss 0.033 0.108 0.104 0.088 -0.087 -0.126 0.004 -0.07 -0.237 -0.043 1 
            















Deal Size:        
DVpoAebit 0.1675 2.7003 0.01 0.9998 8.2981 0.001 
DVpoANA 0.1682 2.7756 0.01 0.9999 11.7945 0.001 
DVpoANI 0.1628 3.5509 0.001 0.9979 5.3268 0.001 
DVpoATA 0.1688 2.7284 0.01 0.9999 13.0074 0.001 
DVpoANS 0.167 3.907 0.001 0.9999 9.5742 0.001 
DVmoACA 0.1663 3.9351 0.001 0.9993 5.0876 0.001 
        
Aggressive Strategy 1:         
DVmoTNI 0.6439 3.0317 0.01 0.9623 7.8652 0.001 
DVmoTebit 0.4187 1.9785 0.05 0.9083 6.1036 0.001 
        
Target Size:         
TNS 0.4174 3.1832 0.001 0.6535 3.7382 0.001 
Tee 0.7929 8.921 0.001 0.9172 21.1009 0.001 
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mathematical equivalence per Figure 6), with FDI a full 60% more likely to originate 
from deteriorating countries.  A p-value of less than .001 also supports H1. 
Escape Motive and Deal Characteristics 
All indicators load properly and latent variables exhibit requisite convergent and 
discriminant validity (see Tables 5 and 6 for details).  Loadings for deal size are 
especially high, and all pertinent indicators were retained, as opposed to adopting 
dimension reduction rules based on scree plot or Eigen value analysis.  According to 
Geffen (2005), when using PLS rather than SEM, higher loadings are expected (i.e., the 
loadings shown may have been in the .8 range had I used SEM), and a more holistic 
treatment of instruments may be preferable to rote adherence to strict dimension 
reduction rules (MacCallum & Austin, 2000; Straub et al., 2004). 
As Figure 12 and Tables 6 and 7 show, all predicted main effects are supported 
(via PLS analysis) except for the predicted links between firms having an escape motive 
preferring both public targets and targets with more tangible assets.  While coefficient 
signs for these two links were consistent with the proposed direction, each path had a p-
value of .108, indicating that they fall short of the minimal cutoff for statistical 
significance.  Remaining paths were statistically significant at various levels (.001, .01, 
.05, and .1). 
Degree of Change and Deal Characteristics 
Figure 13 and Tables 7 and 8 report detailed results regarding how the degree of 
change affects deals.  Eight of nine predicted effects were statistically significant (the link 
with target intangible assets was again not found to be a statistically significant 
predictor).  Two of these effects, however (related to premiums and market cap), had 
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effects in the opposite of the proposed direction.  It seems that firms do not pay higher 
premiums for highly valued firms.  Perhaps, as Simon and Johnson (1990) suggest, 
overpaying to acquire targets is contrary to the proposed goal of recouping loss.  Thus, 
much like Kahenman and Tversky’s (1982) horse-bettors, while firms do seek targets 
with high earnings upside, overpaying for overvalued firms is something they actively try 
to avoid. 
Type of Change as a Moderator of Degree of Change and Deal Characteristics 
Figure 13, Table 7, and Table 8 report my findings with respect to moderation.  
Results here are mixed.  In terms of statistical significance, a subgroup analysis 
examining one type of firm at a time (firms with escape vs. traditional motives) clearly 
shows that degree of change matters more for escaping firms: eight of nine proposed 
links here were found to be significant, versus just two for firms with traditional motives.  
When coefficient differences are examined, however, just four of nine proposed 
differences are statistically significant.  And one of these four, premium, is significant in 
the opposite of the proposed direction.  Market capitalization, while not statistically 
significant, also exhibits a coefficient whose sign is the opposite of the proposed 
direction.  This mirrors similar findings from the previous section.   
Of note is the impact that separating effects by motive has on explanatory power.  
One reason that effect sizes were smaller in Figure 12 versus Figure 13 is that weak and 
non-significant effects of traditional motives attenuated stronger effects of escape  
motives.  For example, the effect (R-squared) of the degree of change on target size 
increases from .13 to .34 when examining firms with escape motives in isolation. 
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Table 7 















P2: Escape Motive 
Deal Char Actual 
Propensity + Loss Aversion + n/a n/a n/a 
AggBook n/a n/a n/a - Speed - 
AggMarket n/a n/a n/a - Speed - 
TargIntAss n/a n/a n/a - Speed - (ns) 
Public n/a n/a n/a - Speed - (ns) 
TargSize n/a n/a n/a + Speed + 
TargMktValue n/a n/a n/a + Speed + 
Deal Size n/a n/a n/a - Speed - 
Non-Friendly n/a n/a n/a - Speed - 
Premium n/a n/a n/a + Speed + 
      
(table continues) 
Note:   P-Value for propensity difference between firms with or without an escape motive < .001 
Significance levels for other hypotheses listed in Table 7 
 
Final Count:  Predicted = Actual Direction (Statistically Significant):  24 (18) 
 Predicted ≠ Actual Direction (Statistically Significant):  4 (2) 
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Table 7 (Continued) 
Summary of Proposed Versus Actual Relationships 
DV 















P4: Deg Ch Esc vs. 
Trad Actual 
Propensity n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
AggBook + Breakeven + + Breakeven + 
AggMarket + Breakeven + + Breakeven + (ns) 
TargIntAss + Breakeven + (ns) + Breakeven - (ns) 
Public + Breakeven + + Breakeven + 
TargSize + Both + + Both + 
TargMktValue + Both - + Both - (ns) 
Deal Size - Speed - - Speed - (ns) 
Non-Friendly - Speed - - Speed - (ns) 
Premium + Speed - + Speed - 
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Table 8 




(versus firms w/ traditional motives) 
 
Degree Inst. Ch. 
(full sample) 
 
Degree Inst. Ch. 
























TargSize 0.25 3.51 0.001 0.23 2.79 0.01 0.58 4.56 0.001 
TargMktCap 0.11 1.87 0.05 -0.10 3.77 0.001 -0.23 2.32 0.05 
AggBook -0.09 2.07 0.05 -0.01 0.61 ns 0.05 1.75 0.05 
AggMarket -0.12 2.36 0.05 0.04 1.75 0.05 0.10 1.33 0.10 
TargIntAss -0.14 1.24 ns 0.06 0.60 ns 0.03 0.17 ns 
Deal Size -0.12 2.71 0.01 -0.10 1.75 0.05 -0.13 1.94 0.05 
Public -0.09 1.24 ns -0.04 0.63 ns 0.19 2.50 0.01 
Non-Friendly -0.09 1.49 0.10 -0.10 2.01 0.05 -0.17 2.77 0.01 






Table 8 (Continued) 
Beta Coefficients, T-Statistics, and Significance Levels 
 
 
Degree Inst. Ch. 
(for firms w/ traditional motives) 
 






Level Path Coefficient T-Statistic 
Significance 
Level 
TargSize 0.13 1.13 ns 0.46 2.49 0.01 
TargMktCap -0.08 1.03 ns -0.15 1.06 ns 
AggBook -0.13 2.69 0.01 0.18 3.45 0.001 
AggMarket 0.02 0.78 ns 0.08 0.84 ns 
TargIntAss 0.07 0.36 ns -0.04 0.16 ns 
Deal Size -0.11 1.06 ns -0.02 0.18 ns 
Public -0.18 1.21 ns 0.37 2.45 0.01 
Non-Friendly -0.09 1.10 ns -0.08 0.80 ns 




CHAPTER 6:  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Support for the notion that escape happens, and is a genuine and legitimate OFDI 
motive, is quite strong.  Regarding support for the effects of escape motives on deal 
characteristics, support in terms of statistical significance is wide, but effect sizes for 
some DVs are small.  In other words, it is possible that escape motives do not negate 
economic fundamentals or rational analysis, but instead affect decisions at the margin.  
Thus, nearly every relationship I examine is statistically significant, but with several 
modest effect sizes. 
One likely reason for the relatively small effect sizes of some DVs is the fact that 
my research design accounted for the most prominent established antecedents (related to 
home firm, industry, country, and temporal effects). Thus, it is possible that these 
presented r-squared figures may actually resemble incremental changes in explained 
variance had control variables been explicitly, statistically modeled.  Viewed in this light, 
effect sizes are quite comparable to similarly published JIBS studies. 
Ultimately, of the 28 hypotheses I proposed, 24 were in the predicted direction 
(18 statistically significant), while 4 were in the opposite direction (2 statistically 
significant). 
Qualitative follow up studies that enable scholars to examine stated (vs. revealed) 
decision rationales may provide further evidence for my proposed reasoning behind each 
hypothesis.  This may also shed light as to whether my speculated reasons for why 
coefficients for premiums and market cap had signs in the opposite of the predicted 
direction.  Also, as my research design controlled for firm differences (such as  
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experience), follow up studies with different research designs may instead check to see if 
they matter in this context (e.g., experience with Country A or Industry X might mean 
quicker deals there). 
Another interesting line of future research entails a closer examination of 
relationships between escape-based FDI and traditional FDI motives.  For example, P3 
suggests that varying degrees of institutional degradation at home serves as the impetus 
for escape-based FDI.  Escape motives that prompt decisions to internationalize may 
ultimately transform into (say) asset-exploitation based, market-seeking FDI.  In other 
words, escape motives, rather than being a rival motive, may actually serve as an 
antecedent of traditional motives. 
It is my hope that I have made a convincing case for a shift in relative emphasis 
towards institutional studies based on degrees of alignment between goals of the firm and 
the setting they operate in (specifically including home-country settings), as opposed to 
the reflexive focus on either distance or host country attributes.  I also hope that I have 
made convincing case that a fifth FDI motive, escape-based FDI, deserves a place at the 
table along with the four established motives.  
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